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FOREWORD
The national strategy of the United States has reemphasized the Asia-Pacific region, but subsequent
actions in that direction seem to be preempted by
more immediate crises elsewhere in the world and by
internal political disputes. Nonetheless, events in the
region continue to evolve and the United States must
stay actively engaged or lose its long-standing influence. With the status of China rising and other regional states weighing their options between Chinese and
American power, a better understanding by American
policymakers of the region’s disputes is necessary to
maintain American diplomatic, economic, and security
influence under more austere conditions. Of the issues
daunting Southeast Asia, few are as poorly understood
by U.S. policymakers as the dispute between Vietnam
and China over the Paracel Islands.
For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
is pleased to publish its second analysis covering one
of the South China Sea disputes. This monograph examines the economic and security importance of the
region to the claiming states and the violent acts and
potential for instability in the region that have resulted. To better understand the positions of the parties
involved, this monograph delves into the customary
international law claims for sovereignty through historic and occupation doctrines, and the subsequent
maritime jurisdiction claims made through the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. U.S. interests
and resulting involvement are also explained to assist
in understanding these positions better and to inform
U.S. policymakers of actions the United States may
take to promote peace and economic development in
an important region. This analysis purposefully paral-
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lels an earlier SSI work by the author on the Spratly
Islands which shows the similarities, differences,
and complementary actions involving the two South
China Sea disputes.
Taken in tandem, these Paracel and Spratly Islands’
monographs offer a synergistic analysis of the challenges faced by the states rimming the South China
Sea, as they strive to deal with peace and prosperity
derived from this rich, shared maritime region, and
how the United States may constructively engage there
to support its own interests and those of its partners.
Ultimately, the United States cannot solve the conflict
in the South China Sea alone, but it can contribute to,
facilitate, balance, and support international efforts
to craft a solution from which all may benefit in the
long term.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The region around the Paracel Islands and the
South China Sea is important to the economies of the
surrounding states in terms of the fish resources and
potential for energy reserves, which result in diplomatic and physical clashes. The large flow of maritime
commerce around the Paracel Islands is also crucial
to the economic well-being of the region and the
world, and occupation of the islands dictates control
of the surrounding sea’s maritime traffic, security,
and economic exploitation. Although China currently
occupies all of the Paracels, they are also vigorously
claimed by Vietnam.
The use of customary law and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in establishing claims to the Paracels and surrounding waters
helps explain the perspectives of the disputants. Their
legal positions are especially important for American policymakers as they inform possible solutions
and suggest how to contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. Three key legal questions must be
answered to help sort the disputes: sovereignty over
the islets, the nature of a claimed land feature, and the
delimitation of maritime jurisdiction. Sovereignty is
claimed through customary law, with China and Vietnam using historic doctrine to claim the entire South
China Sea, while both have also used the doctrine
of occupation, which now works to the advantage
of China.
Once sovereignty and feature type are determined, zones of authority may be established by the
occupying state depending on the distance from its
established shore baseline. Internal, archipelagic,
and historic waters are maritime variations of near-
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full sovereign control, which could be disruptive to
economic and navigation activities if awarded to Vietnam or China, who make such claims. Islands above
the high tide mark establish territorial waters and a
contiguous zone, which would carve out 24 nautical
mile (nm) zones around the Paracels but should allow
innocent passage. The length of the 200-nm exclusive
economic zones (EEZ) allows much potential overlap
among land masses and islands in the semi-enclosed
South China Sea. Like territorial waters, Vietnam
and China restrict military activities within the EEZ.
Although such arguments by claimants for more restrictions in these zones are tenuous, they could be
useful justification to cover military actions by states
like China, which is the most active in enforcing a
restrictive EEZ.
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is
the most immediate U.S. concern to ensure naval vessels retain all rights of access. Current policy by China
and Vietnam restricts foreign naval activities in their
zones beyond that normally attributed to UNCLOS.
Concluding an Incidents at Sea Agreement with China
would clarify the rights and responsibilities between
the two. Other forms of government-to-government
interaction could build confidence in present and future agreements, and leverage common interests. U.S.
ratification of UNCLOS is another important step to influence the evolution of future interpretations of freedom of navigation toward more open use. Although
a more difficult proposition, the United States should
demand the clarification of the historic claims made in
the South China Sea in order to facilitate negotiating a
settlement and accelerate economic development.
Open economic access to the South China Sea maritime commons is a second U.S. interest, but one which
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may diverge from freedom of navigation. Access to
the resources of the high seas is an important enough
U.S. interest to stall the ratification of UNCLOS for
nearly 20 years. The United States remains outside the
treaty, however, and holds less influence over how
maritime law is interpreted and evolves, and thus is at
a disadvantage to shape events like whether the South
China Sea becomes a wholly divided and claimed sea.
Such arrangements as a Joint Development Zone or a
Joint Management Zone could stabilize the area and
provide stability and economic development for its
participants. To support any of the joint development
solutions, the United States would have to place its
security interests over potential economic ones.
To contribute to overall stability and prosperity in
the region, the United States must delicately play the
roles of conciliator and balancer as circumstances require. The United States is an honest broker because
it shares goals in common with the disputants. Although the United States may not be truly neutral, it
has less direct demands in the disputes, garners more
trust than most other states, and possesses resources
to bear on these problems, making it a useful interlocutor in resolving problems. In other circumstances,
the United States has intervened in problems around
the Paracel Islands in more parochial ways to balance
the diplomatic field in aid of Vietnam or other partners, and to directly protect its freedom of navigation
interests. This balancer role should deter aggression.
The United States has again made the Asia-Pacific region a major focus of its stated global interests,
and converging national interests between the United
States and China may indicate that some progress on
the issues outlined here are possible. The importance
of the Paracel Islands region to world trade, energy,
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security, and its own interests require careful American involvement. Policymakers must understand the
underlying territorial and maritime claims of China
and Vietnam in order to help manage these issues
peacefully and equitably for the regional states and to
meet U.S. interests. In the end, the conflict in the Paracel Islands is not one for the United States to solve,
but its ability to contribute, facilitate, balance, or support is necessary toward a solution from which all
may benefit.

xii

THE PARACEL ISLANDS AND
U.S. INTERESTS AND APPROACHES
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
INTRODUCTION
As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) rises in
diplomatic, economic, and military stature in global
politics, it is inexorably challenging the preeminent
position that the United States of America has assumed
since the demise of the Soviet Union. During this unprecedented rise, the relations between China and the
United States may be conducted along a continuum of
cooperation, competition, and conflict, making their
many overlapping global interests complex, contested, and of crucial importance to the rest of the world.
In one small area, however, their interactions are relatively simple and direct while remaining momentous
and consequential, and thus their relations represent
an interesting vantage point from which to analyze
the actions between these two powers. Although the
dispute over the Paracel Islands region in the South
China Sea is between China and Vietnam, the United
States has major interests there, and the dispute represents several global trends and problems affecting
other states.
The Paracel Islands regional dispute is based on
vital issues of territorial sovereignty, economic development, military security, and political legitimacy for
Vietnam and China. For maritime and trading powers like India, Australia, the Republic of Korea (South
Korea), Japan, and the United States, this local dispute
holds significant worldwide consequences for use of
the nautical domain concerning freedom of navigation and exploitation of the sea under maritime law,
and for stability and prosperity along the world’s
1

busiest shipping lanes and one of its most rapidly
expanding economic regions. The United States, as
the de facto—if intermittent—guaranteer of stability
and order in the world, has additional interests in
maintaining an atmosphere in the Paracels in which
diplomacy and the rule of international law address
the dispute peacefully. In this way the Paracels are
an illuminating study for larger problems like the
nearby and more complicated dispute over the Spratly Islands. In comparison, the fewer participants and
smaller area involved in the Paracels make this contest
easier to study while still addressing issues of global
importance and allowing discussions of potential
parallel solutions on a smaller scale.
As a microcosm of the South China Sea disputes,
this monograph delves into why the Paracel archipelago warrants examination by U.S. policymakers
in order to discuss nuanced responses to the region’s
challenges. To attain that needed understanding, applicable legal aspects of customary and modern international laws are explored to analyze the competing
maritime and territorial claims, and why and how
Vietnam and China stake rival claims and opposing
maritime legal rights. Throughout, the policies of the
United States are examined through its conflicting interests in the region. Recommendations for how the
United States should engage these issues, a more appropriate task than trying to solve the disputes outright, are then offered.
THE PARACEL ISLANDS REGION1
AND WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
The South China Sea is a body of water in Southeast Asia partially enclosed by the continental coasts of
Vietnam and China, and portions of the shores of Tai2

wan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.
Hundreds of tiny geologic features dot the 122,648,000
square nautical miles (nm, or 1.5 times the size of the
Mediterranean Sea) of the South China Sea. Its second
largest natural grouping, the approximately 1302 features of the Paracel Islands archipelago, covers about
2 square-nm of land above sea level spread across an
area of about 13,000 square-nm of sea.3 The Paracel
Islands are located in the northwestern quarter of the
South China Sea, centered approximately 185-nm east
of the coast of Vietnam and 165-nm southeast of the
Chinese island of Hainan Dao (see Map 1). These low
coral islands consist of two main sub-chains: the Crescent Group to the west and the Amphitrite Group to
the north, with additional isolated islands, reefs, and
banks scattered further to sea (see Map 2). The Paracel
Islands stretch 105-nm from northeastern Tree Island
to southwestern Triton Island and 100-nm from northwestern North Reef to southeastern Herald Bank.4
Around the Paracels, the ocean depth ranges from
1,000 to 2,000 meters (m), classifying it as part of the
continental shelf of the Asian landmass and relatively
shallow compared to the 3,000-m and deeper waters to
the east and south. A finger of this deep water divides
the Paracels in the north from mainland China and the
eastern half of Hainan Dao.5 Although unremarkable
in its composition, the physical proximity and characteristics of these features, surrounding waters, and
ocean floor play a very important role in the dispute
over the Paracel Islands region and the potential ways
to address this dispute.

3

4

Map 1. South China Sea.

Source: David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, December 2011.
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Map 2. Paracel Islands.

Source: Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, Map 801947, Washington DC: CIA, April 1992.

Local Economic Importance of the Paracel Region.
Joining the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the warm
South China Sea is among the most biologically diverse areas in the world, rich in both endangered species and commercial fish like tuna, mackerel, scads,
and coral reef fish.6 The South China Sea is one of the
earth’s top four productive fishing zones in terms of its
annual maritime catch, representing about 10 percent
of the world’s total take.7 This sea is a major source of
fish eaten in Vietnam and China, contributing to China being the world’s largest consumer and exporter of
fish. It was Vietnam’s second largest foreign exchange
earner in 2010, accounting for 7 percent of all exports,
and provides Vietnam “close to half of the total protein intake of a significant portion of the population.”8
The Paracels’ rich waters contribute to this abundance
as the closest fishing grounds in the South China Sea
to the fleets in Hainan Dao and central Vietnam.9
The characteristics of the partially enclosed South
China Sea and migratory nature of these fish stocks
mean this important source of food and trade is a
shared resource among the bordering states posing a
“tragedy of the commons” dilemma in managing its
stocks and genetic sustainability.10 Since the late-1990s
overfishing, coral reef damage, and coastal and shipping pollution have threatened the sustainability of
fishing in the South China Sea with no substantial international coordination yet in place to halt continuing
dwindling fishing stocks.11 Declining stocks in home
waters—China, for instance, has nearly exhausted its
coastal waters of fish—have forced fisherman into waters also claimed by other states, precipitating adverse
reactions by maritime law enforcement officials in
order to protect the commercial interests within their
claimed areas. Fishing-related incidents thus are com6

mon in the South China Sea and sometimes lead to
diplomatic or armed clashes.12
The claiming of hydrocarbon energy resources in
the South China Sea is another part of this maritime
commons dispute. The South China Sea has been
called a “second Persian Gulf” or “hydrocarbons Eldorado” for its rich potential,13 leading some sources,
like the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World
Factbook, to extrapolate the possibility for oil or natural gas strikes around the Paracel Islands.14 However,
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA)
in 2013 gave virtually no proven or probable reserves
for oil and less than .1 trillion cubic feet (tcf) for natural gas in the Paracel region. The USEIA’s analysis of
the underlying geology shows that most conventional
hydrocarbon potential is located in the shallow coastal
areas around the South China Sea and not in deeper
waters like those surrounding the Paracel Islands,
leaving in doubt the possibility for any economically
recoverable conventional hydrocarbon finds there.15
Although the Paracel region seems to lack other
forms of hydrocarbon, initial tests promise significant
amounts of methane hydrates,16 a form of carbon energy considered more potent than coal, oil, and other
types of natural gas. Due to technological limitations
and the uncompetitive cost of extraction compared to
conventional natural gas, methane hydrates are not recoverable economically at present, but represent “one
of the world’s largest reservoirs of carbon-based fuel”
in the coming decades.17 For both Vietnam and China,
energy-starved but growing economies in societies
imbued with long histories and cultures of patience,
methane hydrates may be a future treasure trove if
the oil and gas deposits found elsewhere in the South
China Sea are not realized around the Paracel Islands.

7

Further afield in the South China Sea beyond the
Paracel Islands, both Vietnam and China have exploited conventional oil and natural gas finds in their
coastal areas—sometimes in direct contention with
each other—by establishing capability for offshore
drilling through international partners. Since the
1990s, Vietnam’s national oil company, PetroVietnam,
has expanded offshore oil and natural gas production
through a variety of international companies including Chevron, British Petroleum (BP), ConocoPhillips,
India’s ONGC Videsh, Russia’s Gazprom, ExxonMobil, and its current largest investor, the French independent Parenco.18 Chevron is a partner in the Cuu
Long and Phu Khanh Basins just offshore of southern
Vietnam, exploiting fields estimated at 5-tcf in proven
and probable reserves of natural gas, and BP helps develop the larger Nam Con Son centered 250-nm southeast of Ho Chi Minh City.19
China is the world’s second largest consumer of
energy, and its demand will double in the next 25
years, with more than half of that imported.20 Since
the early-1980s, China’s largest national oil company,
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),
has been its main energy developer and principle
partner with international companies like BP, Brazil’s
Petrobras, Petro-Canada, Australian BHP Billiton, and
Hong Kong-owned and Canada-based Husky Energy.
Initial Chinese offshore exploitation occurred in the
nearby Pearl River Mouth Basin and the Qiongdongnan Basin (between Hainan Dao and the Paracels), but
CNOOC has ventured into deeper water spurred by
dwindling production. They discovered with Husky
the Liwan 3-1 gas field about 200-nm southeast of
Hong Kong, containing an estimated 4- to 6-tcf of
proven or probable reserves of natural gas. CNOOC
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expects to produce .1-tcf annually from Liwan in 2014.
They averaged 70 million barrels (bbl) of oil in 2011
from its other South China Sea operations. To expand
its capability further, CNOOC launched its most advanced deep water drilling platform in 2011, costing
$925 million, which first deployed in May 2014 as the
Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig, 17 nm southwest of the Paracel’s Triton Island, to explore in waters 120 nm from
the Vietnamese coast on Vietnam’s continental shelf.21
As the technical limits of drilling push further,
the extensive overlapping claims by Vietnam and
China in the South China Sea portend much competition and conflict between the two. For instance, in
June 2012, rival territorial claims like the ones over the
Jiangan and Wan’an Basins resulted in China unsuccessfully inviting foreign companies to explore nine
drilling blocks approximately 60-nm east of Vietnam,
drawing protests from Vietnam since PetroVietnam
had already awarded these areas on its continental
shelf to ExxonMobil and Gazprom for exploration.
In 2012, Vietnam also protested China offering part
of its Block 65, very close to the disputed Paracels,
for development after unsuccessfully searching for a
foreign company to engage in a nearby area in 2011.22
About 200-nm southeast of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam drills energy from its Blue Dragon field “less than
eight kilometers west of the [Chinese] Benton Block,
and within or astride China’s claim line,” also exacerbating tensions between the two sides.23 As of May
2014, tensions exploded when the Haiyang Shiyou
981 rig started exploring in waters 120 nm from the
Vietnamese coast on Vietnam’s continental shelf with
an intense standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese
maritime forces. Violence ensued with multiple at-sea
collisions, the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel,
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and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam’s cities that killed at
least 4 people and were the worst in decades.24
Such conflicting operations also make doing other
business in the region costly and risky, as demonstrated by Beijing’s threats to foreign companies in
China if they help develop the stakes of other claimants.25 China also dominates the economy of Vietnam,
which is vulnerable to Chinese pressure.26 China
disapproves of the more than 200 international companies contracted for oil and natural gas services by
the coastal states in the greater South China Sea region because it internationalizes and complicates the
dispute. In a demarche to Vietnam, China implied that
only the companies of “claimant countries could be
involved in such development activities,” and made
18 such diplomatic protests between 2006 and 2007.27
International energy companies have the expertise required to develop these waters but remain reluctant
to do so without long-term stability in the region.28
As one foreign energy analyst in Vietnam observed,
“When push comes to shove, none of the foreign oil
and gas companies are going to risk their business
in China for something small in Vietnam.”29 The potential for major energy finds in the South China Sea
has driven the surrounding states to press aggressive
claims for this disputed commons, which in turn hobbles their efforts by making exploration and exploitation economically riskier, politically contentious, and
militarily dangerous.
Unfortunately, the feuding South China Sea states
“view the competition for access to and ownership
of the resources as a zero-sum game.”30 For instance,
after the 2008 dissolution of the disappointing Joint
Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), the first and
only multilateral cooperative arrangement among the

10

South China Sea states, its former members Vietnam,
the Philippines, and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) continued to explore unilaterally in their overlapping claimed areas, and China increased the number of its enforcement vessels in the region.31 However,
joint development in a contested area is not only possible, but can be mutually beneficial as demonstrated
by Vietnam and Malaysia in a joint development area
equidistant between their mainland coasts.32 China
has asserted it welcomes joint development activities
in the South China Sea under the precondition that
“sovereignty belongs to China,” according to President Xi Jinping, echoing a policy strictly held since the
1980s.33 China and Vietnam have subsequently agreed
to a less involved joint exploratory agreement in the
Gulf of Tonkin to which they expanded the region of
interest to 2,500 square miles in 2013 and extended its
duration to 2016.34 Nonetheless, enforcement of territorial claims has intensified as new technology has
made previously inaccessible offshore oil and gas
more available, while high energy prices make their
potential more lucrative.35 Thus, political and armed
clashes may occur in order to develop this energy
potential before others exploit it first.
If the waters around the Paracels historically have
been rich fishing grounds and today portend hydrocarbon wealth, the land features themselves have offered much less in economic activities and had not
been permanently inhabited until the establishment
of recent military garrisons.36 The first visitors to the
Paracels may have been Chinese traders collecting
feathers and tortoise shells, but most of the early Chinese references to the South China Sea features mainly
warned of the danger from the reefs, and the geologic
features served mostly as landmarks to navigators
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and occasional shelter to fisherman.37 During the
1920s, the Japanese trading company Mitsui Bussan
Kaisha mined phosphates in the form of guano from
Woody and Robert Islands, the Chinese government
approved mining permits to its citizens into the 1940s,
and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam)
awarded guano mining contracts in the Crescents in
the 1950s and 1960s, but the latter were not economically viable.38 The climate and tiny land area available in the Paracels offers little agricultural promise
despite the rich guano deposits left by millennia of migratory ocean birds (there is no native terrestrial fauna
except tortoises).39 Some experts see the possibility for
marine-based tourism in the region, and in April 2013,
China authorized tourists to visit the Paracels.40
China, which currently controls the entire Paracel
archipelago, is expanding tourism, fishing, and the
military garrison on Woody Island, the archipelago’s
largest feature, as the foundations for a Paracels economy. To support its plans for ecotourism and other
goals, the government plans to spend 10 billion yuan
(U.S.$1.6 billion) on infrastructure improvements.41
In addition to cruise boats and diving, the Chinese
have organized other tourist and sporting activities
such as a 2012 sailboat race to the disputed islands,
despite objections from the Vietnamese government
that such activities violate previous Chinese commitments not to “further complicate” the dispute over
these territories.42 However, all of this collecting, mining, and tourism potential of the islets financially pale
in comparison to the surrounding waters’ fishing and
drilling activities. The islets have yet to produce any
sustained economic yield, or as University of Helsinki
Professor Timo Kivimaki concludes in his anthology
on the South China Sea, “These areas have only been
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economically meaningful when the small reefs and islands have disrupted sea lines of communication.”43
Regional Security Importance of the Paracels.
Although not economically consequential, the land
features of the Paracels hold military importance for
the states claiming them. The historically high amount
of shipping that transits the South China Sea, the natural resource potential, and their strategic position from
the coasts of southern China and central Vietnam give
economic and security significance to the Paracel Islands.44 China’s primary defense interest in the South
China Sea is to control its maritime “back door,” as one
Chinese scholar counted 479 attacks launched against
China from the sea between 1840 and 1949, with 84 of
those being major.45 The Paracels have been a strategic position since the end of the Sino-French war in
1885 when France made Annam (central Vietnam) a
protectorate, built a light house on the Paracel Islands,
and began to press its claim for the islands.46 As the
Middle Kingdom, China had assumed its suzerainty
over the South China Sea islands so that in 1876 China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom (UK) specifically claimed the Paracels as Chinese territory, and in
1883 China terminated unauthorized German survey
activities in the Paracels and Spratlys.47 To reinforce its
claims to the Paracels, imperial China landed a military survey team in 1907, annexed the islands in 1910,
and tried to establish a presence in the area through
military and scientific expeditions, but internal strife
interfered with China establishing effective control.48
During the prelude to World War II, France formally claimed the Paracels in 1933 to counter the
growing threat of imperial Japan to its Indochinese
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colonies, and set up a military weather station. By
1937, a French military report called a possible Japanese military presence in the Paracels intolerable for
Indochina, with Britain urging the French to garrison
the islands and build an airfield for their (and also
British Malaya’s) defense.49 In 1938, French Vietnamese forces occupied the Paracels. Japan invaded the
Paracels in turn in 1939, and annexed the islands by
claiming to occupy the territory of China, with whom
Japan was already at war.50 Following World War II,
Japanese forces withdrew from the Paracels in August
1945, and Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan after
1949) forces took control of the northern Amphitrite
Group of the Paracels in October 1945 and occupied
Woody Island in 1946. Meanwhile, the French made
an unsuccessful attempt to force the ROC soldiers
from the Paracels and settled for a foothold in the
western Crescent Group by occupying Pattle Island
with a platoon of Legionnaires.51
In 1950, the French government transferred responsibility for the defense of the Paracels to the Vietnamese.52 Japan formally relinquished its claims to
all of the South China Sea islands at the 1951 peace
conference in San Francisco, but the conference members did not recognize China or Vietnam’s claims
to the islands.53 The ROC forces withdrew from the
Paracels during the Chinese Civil War, to be replaced
by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in the mid1950s, but during the gap between Chinese occupations, neither France nor Vietnam made an attempt to
retake the vacated Amphitrite Group, opting instead
to maintain good relations with China. The newly independent RVN took physical control of Pattle Island
in 1954.54 In February and March 1959, RVN forces
challenged a slow infiltration of Chinese fisherman
into the Crescent Group and subsequently occupied
14

Duncan, Drummond, and Palm Islands.55 As each side
became more focused on the Second Indochina War,
the RVN withdrew from most of the Crescent Group
in 1966, leaving only a civilian weather observation
post on Pattle Island.56
After the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, American
withdrawal from the region following its war in Vietnam, and discovery of oil deposits in the South China
Sea, South Vietnam tried to reassert its position. China
likely intended to slowly pressure the South Vietnamese from the Paracels, expecting the RVN government
to crumble, and to take the islands from them and
minimize potential objections from fellow communist
rivals, the Soviet Union and Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV or North Vietnam), whose claim to them
was conflicted.57 In July and September 1973 the RVN
announced contracts for exploring oil offshore, and redeclared its administration over the South China Sea
islands.58 In reply, on January 11, 1974, the PRC diplomatically challenged Vietnam’s claims and for the first
time linked its competing island claims with maritime
rights.59 In turn the RVN sent commandos, two cutters,
one destroyer escort, and a mine sweeper to the Crescent Group, and on January 17, removed from Robert
and Money Islands irregular forces deployed there by
armed Chinese fishing vessels.60 On January 19, RVN
forces attempted to also take Duncan Island but were
engaged by two PLA Navy (PLAN) sub-chasers and
four mine sweepers that had rushed to the fighting
and subsequently drove off the RVN forces. From that
decisive 40-minute battle, probably one ship from each
side was sunk, six ships severely damaged, 18 Chinese
and 53 Vietnamese sailors killed, and 48 Vietnamese
taken prisoner (including one American advisor). Although these results were incompletely reported and
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are questioned, the PRC indisputably controlled all of
the Paracel Islands after the battle and remains its sole
occupier.61 For a century, the Paracels have been the
prize for military forces controlling this strategic position in the South China Sea, and it remains militarily
important today to its claimants.
After the Second Indochina War and reunification
of Vietnam in 1975, hostility over territorial disputes
continued between the two erstwhile communist allies, the PRC and the SRV. Minor military skirmishes
continued around the Paracels into the 1990s, such as
one in April 1979 in which China captured 24 Vietnamese troops, or March 1982, when Chinese forces
held a Vietnamese reconnaissance boat and its crew of
10.62 Another deadly naval clash occurred as China belatedly seized land features in the disputed Spratly Islands, also in the South China Sea. On March 14, 1988,
warships from the PLAN and the Vietnam People’s
Navy (VPN) exchanged fire off Johnson Reef South,
with the outgunned VPN losing around 70 sailors
and up to three vessels, and the PLAN possibly losing one warship.63 On March 19, 1992, the PLA landed
on Da Ba Dau Reef, also in the Spratly Islands, resulting in a smaller skirmish with Vietnamese forces who
already occupied nearby Sin Cowe East Island.64 The
most deadly example of the animosity between the
SRV and the PRC, however, was a brief but ferocious
land border war in 1979 in which Vietnam suffered
between 35,000 and 62,000 casualties, and China suffered 20,000 to 63,500 casualties.65 Although military
forces between Vietnam and China have not clashed
since the early-1990s this recent bloody history and
other confrontations described further in this text
make the situation dangerous for both these countries
and for outside parties like the United States, who
have interests in the region.66
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With a history of foreign depredations—including
the U.S. involvement in the Second Indochina War
violating claimed Chinese and North Vietnamese sovereignty over the South China Sea—neither China nor
Vietnam will tolerate foreigners taking advantage of
their territory again.67 This military legacy particularly
menaces modern China’s prosperity since 90 percent
of its foreign trade was shipped, and 57 percent of petroleum and 27 percent of natural gas was imported
from overseas in 2012, half of this energy imported
through the South China Sea, destined for five of the
world’s top 10 busiest ports, which are Chinese.68 To
defend their national interests, Chinese military leaders consider the South China Sea important to the
PRC’s security. After examining China’s many border disputes, Dr. M. Taylor Fravel, Chinese scholar at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, concluded
that “China has fought to protect its core interests including . . . the establishment of a maritime frontier.”69
Their maritime “near sea strategy” is to neutralize any
threat within the “first island chain,” defined as a line
connecting Borneo, the Philippine, Taiwan, Ryukyu,
Japanese, and Kurile Islands, to ensure access to the
Pacific Ocean and prevent a “Great Wall in reverse.”70
Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was
also concerned about territorial disputes along key
shipping lanes when he stated in 2013:
A single irresponsible action or instigation of conflict could well lead to the interruption of such huge
trade flow, thus causing unforeseeable consequences
not only to regional economies, but also to the entire
world.71

Such sentiment explains, in part, the regional contention for otherwise uninhabited and unproductive
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land features. Territorial disputes are the most common cause of fighting between states,72 which is why
one analyst dubbed the South China Sea islands “the
least unlikely trigger” to start a conflict in the South
China Sea.73
After gaining a foothold and then the entirety of
the Paracel Islands, the PRC has administratively and
militarily built them into its forward outpost in the
South China Sea. The PLA began fortifying Woody Island in 1959, and since 1971 has steadily upgraded its
facilities in the Paracels, including a military airfield
begun in 1993 which is now a length of over 2,500-m.74
This Woody Island facility allows operations of eight
or more fourth generation Chinese fighter aircraft like
the Su-30MKK or Su-27SK and the JH-7 bomber with
combat ranges that could strike targets around the
South China Sea, including Manila, the Philippines,
and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.75 China also maintains two port faculties in the Paracels on Woody and
Duncan Islands. The naval base on Woody Island is
an artificial harbor with a concrete dock 500-m long
and capable of accommodating destroyer and frigate
class vessels.76 The PLA also upgraded its South China Sea Sansha garrison to a division-level headquarters on Woody Island in 2012. Its responsibilities are
“defense mobilization, . . . city [meaning municipal]
guard, support for the city’s disaster rescue and relief
work, and [direction of] militia and reserve troops.”77
Actual defense of the Paracels, however, is given to
the PLAN under the South Sea Fleet.78 Some analysts
see the increased military capabilities in the Paracels
as an expansive move by the PRC in hard power, allowing it more influence in Southeast Asia and better
control over its sovereign claims to the South China
Sea, as well as acting as a potential platform to chal-
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lenge U.S. power in the region.79 In addition to the air
and naval power projection capabilities the Paracels
offer, the PRC has also turned them into a sophisticated signal and intelligence monitoring station that
blankets some of the smaller satellite islands and is
capable of monitoring nearly all of the South China
Sea, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and high frequency signals from Malaysia.80
From its Paracel position, the PRC can control the
busy South China Sea sea lanes and airspace militarily, and it may be the first strategic waypoint “pearl”
in a power projection “necklace” that protects Chinese
maritime interests and exerts influence from the South
China Sea to the Persian Gulf.81 From this perspective,
Woody Island is “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” able
to monitor and counter U.S. power in the region and
deter its support to Taiwan or other nearby partners.82
However, this view may alarmingly overstate the incremental military buildup that may be based simply
on increased Chinese economic capacity and political
interests. The establishment of a division-level headquarters, for instance, brings with it no additional
troops and only reflects the Sansha municipality’s
administrative upgrade to “city” status.83 Some commentators point out that military capabilities, like
anti-ship missiles or strike aircraft, in the Paracels at
best duplicate those already on Hainan Dao and thus
add little new capability,84 although basing on the
Paracels does extend a weapon system’s range by 175nm into the South China Sea. The tiny Paracel Islands,
however, do not allow basing of much significant
military capability, and their forward position makes
them vulnerable. As U.S. Rear Admiral (Retired) Mike
McDevitt explained, “Putting garrisons on Woody
Island or elsewhere in the Paracels would effectively
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maroon these guys, so the only advantage would be
just showing the flag—to say, ‘We are serious’.”85 Although militarily capable, the Paracels garrison may
be as much a political declaration to better enforce
sovereign and economic claims to the South China Sea
as a military outpost.
The PRC, with its extensive claims and capable
naval and maritime civilian forces, has been the most
assertive in enforcing its claims in the South China
Sea; however, Vietnam and other bordering states
have also emphasized their claimed rights in the
region, using naval forces against other states’ perceived encroaching commercial activities. For example, from February and March 1959, South Vietnam
used its naval advantage to evict Chinese fisherman
from Duncan Island and finally gained firm control
of the Crescent Group.86 In return, China began naval patrols around the Paracels in 1960 and extended
them throughout most of the South China Sea by 1987,
boldly protecting an area that it considers its “inherent
territories.”87 The Chinese believe they are defending
their waters against “increasing encroachment on the
part of Vietnam, and the Philippines in particular, and
what they [the Chinese] saw as self-serving meddling
by the U.S.”88 Patrolling by both Vietnam and China
has resulted in cycles of aggression by naval ships
against foreign civil vessels, leading to numerous illegal actions cited against the other side’s navy.89 Such
incidents peaked in number and intensity of violence
between 1987 and 1995. Although less frequent now,
a recent example occurred in May 2011 when PLAN
vessels used weapons to threaten Vietnamese fisherman in disputed South China Sea waters, and in June
when the VPN carried out live fire exercises as part
of a larger protest against Chinese actions.90 Naval
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ships from all of the states have, nonetheless, played
a more subdued role in these waters, despite the occasional threat or use of armed naval vessels to counter
foreign violations.91
Instead of its navy, China now prefers to use its
maritime law enforcement ships to protect its claims,
although backed by the PLAN which often shadows
just over the horizon.92 Five disparate PRC maritime
enforcement agencies have aggressively policed China’s interests and kept tensions high throughout the
South China Sea.93 In 2013, the Chinese government
consolidated four of these agencies into a single paramilitary coast guard called China Marine Surveillance
under a new National Oceanic Administration, creating an “‘iron fist’ that would replace ineffective operations scattered among a number of agencies.”94 This
streamlining may only partially rein in the aggressive
nature of Chinese patrolling, since other ministries
within China have conflicting views on the South China Sea disputes with the “policy of reactive assertiveness, characterised by strong reactions to provocations
by other parties” still practiced after the reorganization.95 Whereas before the consolidation only one of
these agencies was armed, under the new coast guard,
all of the vessels will be armed, and the number of
sailors and vessels will increase significantly.96
This buildup is meant to counter foreign violations
into China’s claimed waters. China reported 1,303 foreign ships and 214 foreign aircraft “intrusions” into its
claimed space in 2010, an increase from a total of 110
intrusions in 2007.97 In 2009, the PRC’s South Sea Region Fisheries Administration Bureau (SSRFAB) detained 33 Vietnamese ships and seven more in 2010.98
In May 2011, the Vietnamese claim that a Chinese
enforcement ship cut the cables of a PetroVietnam oil

21

and gas survey ship in disputed waters near Vietnam,
and in June, a Chinese fishing vessel intentionally
rammed the exploration cables of another Vietnamese
survey ship. 99 Well-reported incidents in 2013 include
a Vietnamese trawler damaged by flares fired from
a Chinese vessel near the Paracel Islands in March,
the ramming and damaging of a Vietnamese fishing
boat off the coast of Vietnam in June, and the beating
of fisherman and eviction of two Vietnamese fishing
boats by the Chinese in Paracels waters in July.100
Some of these incidents have been attributed to
Chinese fishing vessels acting as an auxiliary to enforcement agencies as demonstrated in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between vessels from China
and the Philippines in the South China Sea.101 Although
events involving naval vessels have subsided, the
level of police and commercial vessel incidents has increased as a result of China’s tripling its patrols at sea
since 2008. These pose different but serious problems
because civilian vessels have been “easier to deploy,
operate under looser chains of command, and engage
more readily in skirmishes.”102 The U.S. Pacific Fleet
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Information,
speaking at a conference in a personal capacity recently, warned that the PLAN is using its civilian proxies
for “maritime confrontations [that] haven’t been happening close to the Chinese mainland. Rather, China
is negotiating for control of other nations’ resources
off their coasts.”103 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, head
of the Beijing office of the International Crisis Group,
called it “a brilliant strategy by China to establish their
control over an area without firing a single shot.”104
PRC vessels have been active in enforcing China’s
maritime claims in the South China Sea, exacerbating the tensions among the states involved, as dem-
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onstrated by the Haiyang Shiyou 981 clashes near
Triton Island.
All of the claimants in the Spratly and Paracel Islands disputes have also reacted with force against
Chinese commercial vessels.105 Since 1989, more than
300 incidents against Chinese trawlers have been reported including being fired upon, seized, or expelled,
with three fishermen wounded and 10 ships detained
by the Vietnamese in 2010 alone.106 Throughout the
South China Sea, China’s data shows 750 of its fishing vessels were robbed, seized, or attacked between
1989 and 2010, with 25 fishermen killed or missing, 24
injured, and 800 arrested from waters China claims as
its own. Despite the lucrative return from fishing in
the Paracels region, Chinese fishermen are reluctant to
fish these waters for fear of being attacked or arrested
by Vietnamese marine authorities.107 As the relative
lull in naval and police actions in the South China Sea
during the 2000s seems to be ending, some analysts
fear that a major discovery of energy resources could
fan the flames of more serious clashes in a region lacking the mechanisms for conflict management.108 The
International Crisis Group observes, “While the likelihood of major conflict remains low, all of the trends
are in the wrong direction, and prospects of resolution
are diminishing.”109 Those assessments bode poorly
for the region’s states and for the United States, which
also has significant interests there.
Importance of the Paracels Region to the
United States.
In addition to the South China Sea region holding
huge potential for producing oil and natural gas, it is
also one of the world’s great thoroughfares of energy
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and trade, adding to its strategic significance to the
United States and the international community.110 The
United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Development estimated that 8.4 million tons of maritime
trade—more than half of the world’s annual total—
passed into the South China Sea in 2010. The USEIA
estimates that around 6-tcf of natural gas—over half of
the world’s maritime gas movement—was part of that
trade, as was approximately 14 trillion barrels of oil,
or a third of the world’s volume. These massive movements link energy-rich southwest Asia and northern
Africa to economically vibrant northeast Asia.111 An
estimated 80 percent of Taiwanese, 66 percent of
South Korean, and 60 percent of Japanese energy supplies are imported via the South China Sea, which also
accounts for 40 percent of Japan’s total exports and
imports.112 These busiest shipping lanes in the world
pass by the strategically placed Paracel Islands, 113 and
the sea lanes’ security is crucial to nearby states with
which the United States has a range of formal defense
arrangements, including Taiwan, South Korea, Japan,
Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.114
Economic development in East Asia and the world
would be seriously set back should maritime trade in
the South China Sea be disrupted.115 The PRC, ROC,
and Vietnam each claim all of the Paracel Islands and
most of the South China Sea, and these conflicting and
extensive maritime claims also challenge U.S. economic interests to exploit water column and seabed
resources on what many parties consider high seas or
international waters.116 U.S. economic interests are directly and indirectly entwined in the competition over
the distant Paracel Islands.
As this monograph has shown, this region is not
just another global hot spot, but one with important
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long-term economic, territorial, and security contentions. It is not only one of the world’s most disputed
ocean areas, but also one of the few where violent incidents routinely occur at sea.117 For diplomatic, historic, and military capacity reasons, other states in and
around the region rely on the United States to ensure
stability in the South China Sea.118 This dependence
could make the South China Sea a convenient arena for
a rising China to test U.S. political will and dominance
through increasingly assertive incidents to which the
United States must respond to protect partner and
American security and economic interests.119 A senior
fellow at the Atlantic Council observed that “some in
China may have believed that the global financial crisis that started in late-2007 signaled a U.S. decline of
the U.S. and that the time was ripe to become more
assertive.”120 Thus, the United States may face the difficult dilemma of balancing its interests in support of
allies and partners with protecting its political and
economic relations with the PRC.121 For these reasons,
the American journalist and Stratfor analysis Robert
Kaplan dubbed the South China Sea the world’s “new
central theater of conflict” and “the heart of political
geography in coming decades.”122
Yet mutual economic and political interdependence among these states—and the United States—argues against major conflict or even a Cold War style
rivalry.123 Each state with interests in the South China
Sea also understands the cooperative need for stability, sustainable management of resources, freedom
of navigation, crime prevention, and a host of other
common interests in the region which cannot be attained alone or by force.124 Indeed, in 1998, the United
States and PRC signed the “Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safe-
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ty (or the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
[MMCA]),” designed to prevent incidents between
them.125 Nonetheless, concerns remain that strong motivations, existing tensions, and entrenched positions
need only an accident or miscommunication to create
an incident or open conflict that subjugates all of these
interests.126 Another reason why the South China Sea
is important to the United States is that such incidents
already occur.
Although ostensibly neutral and not a part of any
of the land or maritime claims in the South China Sea,
the United States and other seafaring states do have
international rights in the area which have been challenged in contentious ways—the basis for which are
explained in the next section.127 The comprehensive
claims by the PRC to all of the waters of the South
China Sea, and its government’s interpretation of
international law, encourage the Chinese to bar any
activity by foreign military vessels and aircraft from
what most other states determine to be high seas
and “transitable” Chinese maritime jurisdictions.128
Some analysts believe that U.S. surveillance actions
in the northern South China Sea, which China contends trespasses on its jurisdiction, risk drawing the
United States into a conflict in the region.129 Although
this concern is now based on events in proximity of
Chinese mainland waters, China has protested U.S.
patrols around the Paracel archipelago since the
1960s.130 Should the PRC prevail in its claims to land
features and waters around the Spratly and Paracel
Islands, the entire South China Sea could become a
Chinese lake off-limits to foreign government vessels
without permission.
Despite the deconfliction efforts of the 1998
MMCA, aggressive incidents have occurred between
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Chinese vessels and U.S. craft exercising freedom of
navigation rights. Some of these may have been deliberate clashes by Chinese commercial vessels to create
an incident and show the damaging effects of military
activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs).131 The
most serious military-to-military incident was the
2001 collision of a Chinese fighter jet with a U.S. Navy
EP-3 65 miles southeast of Hainan Dao, which killed
the Chinese pilot and forced the American crew to
an emergency landing at the Chinese base on Hainan
Dao.132 On the surface, Chinese vessels have harassed
the U.S. ocean surveillance fleet ships, including
the USNS Bowditch (2001 and 2002), Bruce C. Heezen
(2003), Victorious (2003 and 2004), Effective (2004),
John McDonnell (2005), Mary Sears (2005), Loyal (2005),
and Impeccable (2009).133 During this last incident, five
Chinese vessels surrounded the hydrographic survey
ship roughly 75 miles southeast of Hainan Dao (half
way to the Paracels) and attempted to snag its towing
cable, to which the U.S. Navy responded by dispatching warships to escort subsequent unarmed survey
and ocean surveillance vessels.134 However, in December 2013 a renewed round of tensions started with the
PRC establishing an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over disputed islands in the East China Sea
with the establishment of a similar ADIZ possible in
the South China Sea, and a near-collision incident between the USS Cowpens and escort vessels of the PRC’s
Liaoning carrier battle group in disputed international
waters of the South China Sea.135 Even if the United
States held absolute neutrality among the disputants,
it might still be drawn into the South China Sea fracas to reinforce its maritime rights guaranteed under
international law.
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LEGAL BASIS AND CLAIMS IN THE PARACEL
ISLANDS DISPUTE
What is the cause of this melee over land sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, assertion of international rights, and police and military incidents around the
South China Sea? To best understand the issues and
in order to better contribute to their solution, this section analyzes the customary (or traditional) law which
governs disputes over sovereignty of land and some
forms of maritime jurisdiction and rights, and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, or Law of the Sea Treaty) which only addresses
maritime issues, but in a more comprehensive and coherent manner.136 This section also examines how each
of the involved parties applies these concepts to support these contentious claims. In this section, disputes
over land sovereignty generally are treated distinctly
from maritime jurisdiction disputes, although either
claim may depend upon the legal standing of the other and may blur together in the case of historic rights
claims, as will be shown.137 Sovereignty determination over geologic features, boundary delimitation of
maritime borders, and the nature of those features as
productive islands or uninhabitable rocks are three
crucial decisions for which the claimants contest.138
Concepts here are covered to the depth needed to apply to the South China Sea and are not meant to be
comprehensive. Complicating such an examination
are the facts that international law is neither complete
nor rigorous enough to be “a constitution” to consider
the full merit of competing claims,139 and some modern
legal regimes may conflict with customary precepts.140
Thus, legal applications may not be the ultimate arbiter to resolve the many differences, but knowing the
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basis of these legal claims may better guide potential
ways to manage disputes.141 In large part, these legal
disputes are how the contenders present their claims,
so examining them this way is useful to illustrate the
issues involved.
Customary International Laws and Claims.
Although by themselves the land features of the
Paracel Islands have sustained no human population
and produced little economically, they are points of
contention because an island may garner legal jurisdiction and control over adjoining waters and resources.142 To establish these benefits, a state uses customary, or traditional, international law to stake its
claim through long association in a historic claim or
discovery and occupation of a feature—each is a separate mechanism to establish sovereignty, but some
states employ them together like overlapping insurance policies. Once sovereignty is determined, the
type of feature owned dictates the forms of maritime
jurisdictions that then extend from it.143
Like common law, customary law has evolved
over the centuries mainly from European traditions
based on generally accepted notions, or past precedence through agreements, arbitration, or rulings
by international courts. Concepts in customary law
evolve as state practices change, and tend to address
only specific issues presented within certain contexts.
Among Asian societies, Western customary legal concepts like sovereignty, the high seas, or coastal jurisdiction have no traditional equivalent which makes
adjudicating ancient claims incongruent with modern
procedures.144 The SRV and PRC, as socialist governments, also assert that “bourgeois international law
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serves the interests of the bourgeoisie only,” although
each employs these methods to advance their interests
even as they seek to change them.145 Customary law
is also not codified and agreed upon in as rigorous a
manner as UNCLOS. All of this makes traditional law
exceedingly complex and open to many interpretations and differences in its application.146
UNCLOS purposefully does not address sovereignty over land and “is premised on the assumption
that a particular state has undisputed title over territory from which the maritime zone is claimed.”147 Thus
customary law is the usual means to settle sovereignty disputes over territory through international law
(though other means exist like conquest or purchase),
and its maritime customs are still sometimes invoked
today. UNCLOS indirectly has spurred island claims
since its negotiations began in the 1970s by assigning
oceanic jurisdiction to nearly any land feature, thereby converting previously avoided desolate rocky obstacles into the focal points of potential oceanic riches
and igniting a form of gold rush over the South China
Sea islets. Along with new technologies and rapidly
expanding populations and economic needs, the new
Law of the Sea Treaty explains why island disputes
have turned more serious and violent in the South
China Sea since the 1970s, and why we study old legal
principles to understand a 21st century problem.148
Historic Vietnamese and Chinese Claims under
Customary Law.
The oldest method of establishing jurisdiction over
the features and waters of the South China Sea is to
claim “historic rights,” “historic waters,” or “historic
title” to them. In essence, this concept states that an
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area has been part of a state, through long continuous
administrative control, economic use, or social links,
should give the claimant special consideration. Such
consideration could include inherent usage rights in
the area, or control over it as internal waters or sovereign territory when the claim is generally recognized
by other states.149 The appeal of maintaining a doctrine
of historic claims comes from the legal principle of stare
decisis (“maintain what has been decided,” or settled
law) offering the advantage of stability and continuity
in law and governance, which is why it was accepted
as a precept by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in 1951.150 In contrast, in traditional East Asian politics
before Western legal concepts were practiced, the historic association of a region to a people or state would
not need a formal legal claim to perennially oversee or
control it.151
Although a practical customary precept, historic
claims are broad and not well defined traditionally or
in the Law of the Sea Treaty, even in Western international law.152 Generally, historic rights recognize that
traditional activities may continue in a designated
area, and, if specifically stated, may include a claim to
a land area or maritime jurisdiction.153 The concept of
historic claims, “over which a nation exercises sovereign authority,” has been occasionally noted “under
international law in limited situations,” but the ambiguity of these concepts’ wide-ranging and sometimes
conflicting interpretations means they may not be useful mechanisms for establishing control.154 Nonetheless, when such claims are made, they are accompanied by detailed historic documentation to build a case
in favor of the claimant, which would then need to be
verified and weighed against other conflicting claims.
Such procedures favor cultures with long traditions
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in writing and recordkeeping. Using this mechanism
to establish sovereignty or jurisdiction under modern
practices requires that claims be backed by effective,
continuous, and unchallenged occupation or administration in order to be valid.155 These latter criteria
are usually hard to establish, and thus may account
in part for the past and present practice of challenging
or ejecting noncitizens from disputed areas in order to
demonstrate some control over the claims,156 resulting
in some of the violent incidents this monograph has
documented.
The South China Sea region has conflicting historic claims made by China and Vietnam.157 Vietnam
presents a classic historic case for all of the Spratly
and Paracel Islands and an undelimitated amount of
much of the South China Sea based on four historical
arguments presented in three White Papers in 1979,
1982, and 1988.158 As evidence, Vietnam presents historic records and maps, physical geographic data,
and references to stele inscribed in Vietnamese showing it controlled and exploited the Paracels by citing
court documents from as early as the reign of King
Le Tanh Tong (1460-97).159 They also cite corroborating European missionaries, navigators, and geographers of that time, and references in the Dutch Journal
of Batavia from the 1630s supporting their claims to
the Paracels.160 Stronger proof from royal court sources are dated from 1802 when the Nguyen Dynasty
(1802-1945) pursued a more active maritime policy
through “systematic measures taken in the fields of
administration, defense, transport, and economic exploitation.”161 Such evidence bolsters the Vietnamese
claim “that the ‘Feudal Vietnamese State’ effectively
controlled the two archipelagoes since the 17th century according to international law.”162 Vietnam also
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invokes the 1884 French claim and administration
over the Paracels while the Vietnamese states were
a French protectorate and ultimate successor to their
Western legal-style claim.163 From such proof, a modern Vietnamese scholar could assert that “a long time
ago, regional countries pursued their normal activities in the East Sea without encountering any Chinese
impediment and they have never recognized China’s
historic rights in the South China Sea. . . .”164 More
archival records are being translated into English to
bolster Vietnam’s historic claim to the entire region.165
The Vietnamese historic claim to the Paracel Islands tends to be inconclusive, however. Many nonVietnamese scholars have found that basic Vietnamese knowledge about the South China Sea region in its
historic documents was weak and depended heavily
on misperceptions of the region conveyed by Europeans. As more accurate information about the Paracels
was attained by Vietnamese authorities during the
19th century, “there is little evidence that the Nguyen
dynasty upheld its claim through declarations, effective occupation, or utilization.”166 The Vietnamese
claim has not been generally recognized, having been
ignored in the 1951 peace conference in San Francisco,
CA, in which Japan relinquished control of the islands
after World War II. Additionally, Vietnam’s claim has
been consistently protested and interfered with by
China since the 1900s.167 Other telling blows were official statements by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (North Vietnam)168 Second Foreign Minister in
1956 and Prime Minister in 1958 that recognized the
PRC’s stated territorial claims, which included both
the Paracel and Spratly Islands, even while acknowledging disagreements over their land border.169 In
1958, the transfer from China to North Vietnam of the
disputed White Dragon Tail Island, a speck in the Gulf
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of Tonkin, was possibly a quid pro quo for recognition
of China’s control over the South China Sea islands.170
Not surprisingly, the Hanoi government offered no
protest when the PLAN defeated the RVN Navy in
1974, and the PRC occupied the entire Paracels group.
That same government today renounces its earlier
support to PRC territorial claims as a necessity during
its wars against foreigners,171 but such recent recantations only underscore a weak historic claim as difficult
to support.
The Chinese historic claim to the South China Sea
and its geologic features is even more extensive than
the Vietnamese stake,172 but just as ill-defined. Whether
China claims all of the sea and resources of the region
(as indicated in terms officially used like “territorial
waters”), just the land features within the South China
Sea (as may be intended with assertions to a “historic
title”), unspecified traditional rights in the region, like
fishing, or some combination of these, they are voraciously defended as “historically belonging to China”
and “China’s intrinsic and inseparable territories”
under the historic claim doctrine.173 Such ambiguity
has been consistent and probably purposeful by both
Chinese governments, since it allows flexibility on the
Chinese side to argue conflicting points in its various
maritime disputes and has made negotiations for the
other claimants more difficult.174 Further complicating
matters is that both the PRC and ROC assert identical
historic and other claims to the South China Sea based
on the same evidence. This mutual position could be
termed “China’s” or the “Chinese” claim, terms which
this analysis employs as pertaining to both or to any
pre-1949 Chinese government.175 Since both sides
recognize only one China, to support a lesser claim
than the one already made could weaken that gov-
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ernment’s appearance of legitimacy—a phenomenon
making settling of disputes in the South China Sea
more difficult.176 Although the claims are the same for
both, the Taiwanese government has rarely asserted
them as boldly or physically as has the PRC.177 Since,
unlike the PRC and Vietnam, the ROC has no foothold
or proximity to the Paracel Islands, its coverage in this
monograph generally refers to its actions before 1949,
and is otherwise assumed to support the PRC’s position in the South China Sea disputes.
The Chinese assert their ancient use of the sea
through archeological evidence of fishing and trading
activities, naval expeditions during the Han (206 BC220 AD) and Ming (1368-1644) Dynasties, and development of a “Marine Silk Route” to Arabia and Africa
during the Tang (618-907) and Song (960-1279) Dynasties.178 The first written records cited to support a historic claim include an indirect reference to the islands
in 1178, and the Chu Fan Chi (A Description of Barbarous
People) written between 1225 and 1242 by an imperial foreign trade inspector, Chau Ju-kau, in which he
refers to “long sand banks in the islands” thought to
mean the Paracels, and recorded the Paracels within
the border of China in 1279.179 Chinese association with
the Paracels is better documented from the late-1800s
through diplomatic interactions with European powers when, for instance, in 1876, China’s ambassador to
Great Britain declared the Paracel Islands Chinese territory; in 1877, when China and France completed an
ill-defined maritime boundary agreement in the Gulf
of Tonkin; and in 1883, when the Chinese expelled a
German survey team from the Paracel Islands.180 A
Chinese survey in 1928 delimited the Paracel Islands
as China’s southern border, but did not include the
more southerly Spratly Islands.181 To clarify its here-
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tofore inconsistent claims against other powers in the
South China Sea, in 1935, a Chinese committee on land
and water boundaries published a list specifying 28
Paracel and 96 Spratly land features above low tide
level as Chinese territory.182 Over the past 2,000 years,
the Chinese avow to be the first to discover, name, and
administer the South China Sea islands.183
In 1947, the ROC consolidated the Chinese historic claim by publishing a map with its “traditional
maritime boundary line” (more often referred to as
the “9-dashed line,” “U-shaped line,” or the “cow’s
tongue” [see Map 1]) enclosing most of the South
China Sea waters and associated land features as its
“indisputable sovereignty.”184 The Chinese claim their
historic links to the Paracels were well recognized
until the 1930s when the French made claim to them
through their then colonial possession of Vietnam,
and the Japanese annexed the Paracels during World
War II. In their support, the Chinese cite an 1887 SinoFrench treaty in which all islands east of a delimitation
line belonged to China. Both the Spratly and Paracel
Islands lie east of this line, although neither was specifically named, and the French would later contest
that the treaty was a local agreement and not one of
such wide scope.185 Nonetheless, during the prelude
to World War II, the Chinese claim that the French
assured them that its “garrison in the Paracels had a
defensive purpose and would not prejudice the legal
resolution of the dispute.”186 The ROC’s 1947 claims
were echoed by the PRC when it claimed sovereignty
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in 1951 and over
maritime rights from these features in 1958. These
claims were formally reiterated in PRC law in 1992 and
1998, and diplomatically in 2009 when China submitted its 9-line claim to UNCLOS.187 Taiwan codified its
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historic waters claim to the region within its U-shaped
line in 1993 in its South China Sea Policy Guidelines, and
reemphasized its broad claim as recently as 2011.188
Thus the Chinese historic claim to the region has been
reinforced in domestic law and recent proclamation
by both the PRC and ROC.
Despite this historic documentation claiming the
Paracels and the South China Sea, there are problems with Chinese arguments because its association
has often lacked the clear consistent claims or effective administration required by modern international
judgments.189 Although it suffers from the same flaws,
Vietnam’s historic claim contests China’s assertions
to acquiescence by other states and that it has been a
victim of European imperial aggression. Vietnam, for
instance, refuses to stamp new PRC passports bearing
a map showing the South China Sea as part of China,
and has opposed an annual May-to-August fishing ban
in the South China Sea imposed by China.190 Non-Chinese scholars also note that competing claims for some
or all of the Paracel Islands have been made since the
1800s by France and Japan, pushing China into asserting formal Western legal style sovereignty claims.191
China’s counterarguments that its sovereignty over
the Paracels was strong until French incursions in the
1930s are viewed dimly in light of inconsistent claims
and the weak exercise of authority up to the end of
World War II.192 During the 1943 Cairo Conference
among the belligerents fighting Japan, attending ROC
President Chiang Kai-shek made no claims for any
Japanese occupied territory in the Paracels or Spratlys,
despite the fact that decisions about occupied lands
was a main topic of the conference. Also, during the
1951 negotiations over the peace treaty with Japan, 47
of 50 participating countries rejected a Soviet call to
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assign the Japanese-conquered areas, including the
Spratlys and Paracels, to the PRC.193 A senior intelligence officer at the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a personal capacity at the U.S. Naval Institute challenged Chinese
historic claims further when he declared in 2013 that:
the rubric of a maritime history that is not only contested in the international community but has largely
been fabricated by Chinese government propaganda
bureaus in order to . . . ‘educate’ the populace about
China’s rich maritime history.194

Chinese and Vietnamese officials have shown historic use of the South China Sea and its features but
not to the level needed to establish effective and continuous control and sovereignty, since other states
were also using and claiming parts of this area during
these periods.195 Some commentators believe China
and Vietnam might have more success by converting their historic sovereignty claims to one of historic
rights to things like fishing, a better documented historic activity by both in the region.196 In short, the Chinese and Vietnamese historic claims for control over
the Paracel Islands and their surrounding waters “can
generally be summarized as incomplete, intermittent,
and unconvincing.”197 Widely accepted international
precedents, like the Island of Palmas Case ruled by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1925 and in subsequent cases,198 find effective administration and occupation of land take precedence over first discovery,
historic claims, or close proximity.199 The Vietnamese
and Chinese historic claims to the Paracel Islands lack
a sufficient weight of evidence to establish the requirements of a sustainable population, persistent effective
control by the respective governments, or of enduring
economic activity to establish clear sovereignty.200
38

Sovereign Claims under the Customary Law
of Discovery and Occupation.
More in accord with modern customary legal precepts—because it is centered on effective control—is
the customary legal principle of discovery and occupation. China and Vietnam each staked out some of
the Paracel Islands using this method, but since the
1974 Battle of the Paracels, only China physically occupies the archipelago. Like historic claims, which are
increasingly being held to the same modern standard
of effective administration, land stakes made through
discovery and occupation require that a claim first be
made for a land feature and then consistently and effectively controlled to remain valid.201 This land must
previously be res nullis (“nobody’s property”),202 and
thus “discovered,” and open for occupation and exploitation. More important is the “subsequent continuous and effective acts of occupation, generally construed to mean permanent settlement,” although for
uninhabitable islands that standard may be less strict
but then garners fewer jurisdictional rights, as will be
covered in the next section.203 Using the indeterminate
nature of historic claim law, one could argue that historic claims fall under the doctrine of discovery and
occupation through long-term association, although
the difference in evidence presented, time frames, and
inclusion of historic waters or rights may make them
separate types of claims, which are often how the parties to the disputes present them.
In the South China Sea, formal discovery and occupation claims started in the 1800s. However, the
Philippines government, for one, insists that, when
defeated Japan renounced its World War II annexations, it left a void in ownership, arguably resetting
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all the geologic features in the South China Sea to res
nullis.204 Vietnam’s history occupying the Paracels was
presented earlier in this monograph. Since Vietnam
currently has no physical control of this island group,
its occupation claims are anemic, although the government still acts in ways consistent with administering
the Paracels. The Chinese discovery and occupation
claim is examined in this section in terms of the evolving requirements for effective control and habitation,
which account for the recent interest over the past 50
years in occupying the land features of the Paracel
and Spratly Islands (mainly through military garrisons so far) from which they would then seek to establish improved sovereignty over the islets and their
surrounding seas.205
In addition to—and supporting—its historic
claim, China also asserts that “Beijing has indisputable sovereignty over the islands based on discovery
and prior occupation” as PRC President Yan Shang
Kun declared in 1991.206 Under its modern application, discovery and occupation of the Paracel Islands
began in 1946 after ROC President Chiang Kai-shek
ordered the occupation of the Amphitrite Group and
followed this with the publication of the infamous Ushaped line claim to the South China Sea.207 Despite
the fact that Nationalist China withdrew its forces in
May 1950 after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War,
the ROC continued to assert its claim over the archipelago based on the 1952 Sino-Japanese Treaty which
recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels.
However, Japan had previously renounced all claims
to the South China Sea islands with no successor assigned, and the 1951 San Francisco Treaty refused to
recognize any Paracels claims. Undeterred, the ROC
government retorted that such actions could not nul-
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lify Chinese sovereignty grounded on earlier historic
claims and occupation.208
Bracketing the ROC’s initial occupation was the
PRC’s subsequent occupation of the Amphitrites in
1956 when it established a physical PLA presence
in the archipelago, allowing the PRC to control it all
since 1974. This Chinese claim received an unintended
boost in 1939 when imperial Japan dismissed French
protests of its invasion of the Paracels, countering that
they were Chinese and not French possessions.209 The
Chinese occupation also was complemented by an
earlier legal claim to all of the Paracels by the PRC
in 1951, and to maritime rights from these features
in 1958.210 As noted earlier, PRC occupation claims
were strengthened by proclamations in 1956 and 1958
by DRV officials acknowledging the PRC claims to
the South China Sea islands, and with Vietnam possibly acquiring White Dragon Tail Island in return.211
After oil was discovered in the South China Sea, the
PRC strengthened its only foothold in the region, the
Amphitrites, by improving infrastructure there, and
in January 1974 sought to extend its physical control
over all of the Paracels when it sent armed citizens
to vacant RVN-claimed Robert, Money, Duncan, and
Drummond Islands to build shelters and show the
Chinese flag. This precipitated the Battle of the Paracels and full PRC control of the archipelago.212 Administrative control was consolidated under PRC laws
passed in 1992 and 1998, specifying Chinese maritime
jurisdiction and rights.213 China has since improved
infrastructure and living conditions on Woody Island
and adjoining Rocky Island, including roads and a
causeway, government and military buildings, a hospital, a hostel, a post office, and commercial shops.214
China furthered its administrative control in July 2012
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with the promotion of Sansha City, headquartered on
Woody Island, as the administrative prefecture-level
city for all of its South China Sea claims including the
Paracel and Spratly Islands.215 These actions by China
are meant to show “effective occupation” of the Paracel Islands, and may with time “ripen into a legitimate
assertion of sovereignty.” In this way, China is adhering to modern international legal practices.216
Just as the Chinese historic claim has been contested, so, too, has its discovery and occupation claims,
though with much less effect since 1974. After World
War II, France sent an expedition to the Spratlys to
dislodge the Chinese occupation and reestablish its
claims by leaving a physical presence in the Crescents.217 While still occupied by both South Vietnam
and the PRC in 1973, the Saigon government actively
explored for oil around the Paracels and Spratlys with
Western oil companies and incorporated the islands
into Vietnamese provinces, directly challenging Chinese claims and setting the stage for the naval battle in
the following year.218 Despite losing physical control
of the Paracels, the SRV has continued actions to administer it by incorporating it as an island district in
the Da Nang independent municipality and subjecting
it to Vietnamese laws.219 As recently as June 2012, Vietnam passed a maritime law reasserting its sovereignty
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and delimiting
its maritime claims for both.220 On the same day, in
response to this challenge to its claimed sovereignty,
China upgraded the status of Sansha City. Vietnam
and the Philippines expectedly protested but, unusually, so did the United States.221 China’s claims to the
Paracels have been contested by other states, although
its current extended occupation is harder to counter.
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With Vietnam’s historic South China Sea claims
no stronger than China’s, it has relied on physical occupation of some of the islets in the Spratly Islands
to reinforce its claims. However, this practice severely
undercuts Vietnam’s own discovery and occupation
claim in the China-dominated Paracel Islands.222 Vietnam has documented its occupation of the Paracels
back to 1816, with the Jialong Dynasty emperor ordering construction of temples and monuments on the islands in 1835.223 Vietnam could also use an argument
claiming that at least some of the southern Paracel features, like Triton Island and Herald Bank, are in closer
proximity by using a line drawn equidistant between
Vietnam and China, a doctrine the Philippines has
used in its claim for most of the Spratly Islands.224 Universal application of this doctrine would, however,
greatly reduce Vietnam’s claims in the Spratly Islands
to just a few of the westerly most islands without gaining much in the Paracels. Legally, proximity and territorial contiguity arguments are given little weight in
international arbitration, a precedent begun in 1925 in
the Island of Palmas case.225 Despite its historic documentation and assertions of discovery, proximity, and
assumption of French claims, Vietnam’s lack of physical possession of any features undermines an effective challenge to China’s claim derived from physical
occupation of the Paracels.
China’s firm control over the Paracels may be a solution—although a military imposed one—to possession and exploitation of the Paracel Islands by adapting another Roman-based international customary
law, uti possidetis (“as you possess, thus may you possess”). This principle allows a party to maintain as its
property its current possession until its rightful owner
is ascertained. In international law, this is interpreted
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to mean land gained (often in war) remains with the
occupier unless otherwise disposed through a treaty.
This principle was upheld by the ICJ in 1986 when it
ruled to maintain the colonial borders inherited by independent states in the Burkina Faso vs. Mali Case.226
This law could apply to the Paracel Islands if China
keeps its present possessions, even though they were
gained through conflict, unless a subsequent formal
settlement is negotiated. Thus for China, not engaging
with other states on this issue simply maintains the
status quo for its benefit, unless enticed by other gains
to reconsider its position.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
Paracels Claims.
If sovereignty over the Paracel Islands is settled
through customary law, the issue of the maritime jurisdiction around them is the provision of UNCLOS.
The U.S. position on this issue was revealed in 2010
by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional
Forum (ARF):
We believe claimants should pursue their territorial
claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in
accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China
Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to
land features.227

Unlike land claims, “sovereignty to resources in
and under the sea is acquired simply by virtue of distance from coasts. This is important because it affects
the role of territory as a conflict driver,” as already
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demonstrated in this monograph.228 Because of the
importance of UNCLOS, this section discusses the key
points that affect the South China Sea region, including how maritime jurisdiction is determined when
originating from a land feature, the different maritime
zones and their rights, and the sea and land claims that
China and Vietnam have lodged using these rules.
Well-defined maritime boundaries and agreed
upon rights within them are necessary to peace and
stability on the ocean commons.229 Customary maritime law, through most of history, governed space
and actions on the seas by allocating three-mile-wide
territorial waters from a coast, with general agreement on rights for navigation and taking of resources.
Since the 1950s, however, management of the sea has
become much more regulated and comprehensive
through a series of international treaties culminating in UNCLOS, which was negotiated from 1973 to
1982 and took effect in 1994. This treaty gives coastal
states a 12-nm territorial sea and an EEZ of limited
economic control to 200-nm from the coast, and possibly a continental shelf extension to the natural limit
of its seabed shelf (to a maximum of 350-nm). It also
has provisions for archipelagic states to enclose the
waters around and between their islands as internal
waters, giving more economic and security control
within their physically fragmented countries.230 These
maritime boundaries of state control are premised on
the type of land feature—inhabitable land or unproductive rock—each emanates from so that issues of
sovereignty, topography, and classification of a land
feature determine maritime boundaries.231
Both Vietnam and the PRC have ratified this convention, but with reservations. Taiwan is not an eligible member, although it generally follows its rules, and
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the United States has signed but not ratified the treaty.232 Technically UNCLOS does not apply to disputes
started before it came into effect, including the Paracels claims, but an expectation exists for signatories
to abide by its provisions nonetheless.233 Four forms
of settlements are offered by UNCLOS for dispute
resolution, with arbitration the assumed form since
none of the states involved have yet chosen a method.
States are able to opt out of some of the Law of the
Sea Treaty’s requirements. The PRC, for instance, does
not accept compulsory procedures to settle disputes
over maritime boundaries, military or legal activities
in a zone, or actions of the Security Council, because
those provisions might interfere with the discretionary sovereign powers of the state.234 Thus, UNCLOS is
a well-respected treaty that offers guidance to resolve
disputes like those found in the South China Sea, but
rarely does so through strict enforcement.235
Determination of a Habitable Island from a Rock.
After designating sovereignty over a land feature—which is normally deemed beyond the pale
of UNCLOS—determining the type of feature from
which a maritime zone is claimed is the next step and
one of the functions of the law of the sea. Inhabitable
lands receive all UNCLOS maritime zones and rights,
although these can be constrained by surrounding
zones. Continental states receive full consideration
for territorial waters and adjacent EEZ or continental shelf, while islands may be assigned part or all of
those areas.236 However, what constitutes an inhabitable island is a major concern since a qualified speck
of land could accrue control over 125,000 square-nm
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of water column and seabed through the UNCLOS
regime. Under Article 121:
an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide [, but]
. . . Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.237

The human considerations in the island definition
establishes a sub-class of islands known as “rocks”
which are “barren and uninhabitable insular formations, such as cays and atolls” and receive only territorial waters and a contiguous zone around it regardless
of the size of the rock.238
The U.S. Government compiled Gazetteer of the
Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands has listed 18 features
in the Paracels region as islands or rocks which appear
to be eligible for territorial seas.239 The respected South
China Sea experts Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and
Noel Ludwig note, per UNCLOS Article 121, that reefs
and other features submerged at high tide garner no
maritime zones “even if artificial structures are based
on them,” except for a 500 meter safety zone given
to any artificial or temporary feature at sea.240 Under
these terms, many of the Paracel geologic features garner no maritime zones.241 In 1975, the ICJ advised that
the standard for formal displays of sovereignty, like
markers and policing, is lower for uninhabited areas,
which would also pertain to islands designated as
rocks.242 This monograph has deliberately not used the
word “island” indiscriminately to distinguish features
accurately, as used by this definition.
Because the stakes are high for how a maritime
land feature is designated and the definitions used in
UNCLOS are not precise, leeway is often employed
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to interpret this clause. Whereas physical geography
may distinguish between an island and a nonisland
geologic feature, human needs distinguish between
a habitable island and a rock. The key question then
is, “What does it take to sustain human habitation or
have economic life of its own?”243 A source of indigenous potable water might be one criterion, but would
that prevent a solar powered desalinization plant from
also fulfilling the requirement for human habitation?
Must the island itself sustain its population with the
necessities of life to be habitable, or may it be supplied
from outside? Are lighthouses or navigation markers
sufficient evidence of “economic life of their own”?244
Van Dyke has argued cogently that a habitable island
requires a permanent sustainable population “who
are on the land area for reasons other than just to secure a claim of a distant population for the adjacent
ocean resources.” He explicitly discounts occupation
forces and lighthouse keepers from this group.245 He
further believes, with other experts, that a population
of at least 50 people could constitute a sufficiently
stable community to satisfy the habitation requirement, although he has conceded that “the criterion
may not inevitably require that the insular feature itself be permanently inhabited, but it would require,
at a minimum, that it provide support for a regular
basis by fisheries from neighboring islands. . . .”246 The
indeterminate nature of the habitable criterion leaves
much room for the claimants and experts to disagree.
Under some circumstances, rocks and inhabited
islands may not receive full maritime zones.247 Rocks
receive little consideration under international law
to prevent them from both impinging on the similar
rights of nearby islands or continents that are populous and economically active and from interfering
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with opportunities that should be open to all seafaring
nations when located on the high seas. Additionally,
this helps to reduce the incentive to “reverse engineer”
a barren feature with a settlement that could claim a
maritime zone that would make the feature economically viable when it was not originally.248 Even habitable islands hold lesser status under UNCLOS when
compared against the claims of a continental coast. In
the 1984 ICJ case between Libya and Malta, the latter
was given:
a diminished capacity to generate maritime zones in
comparison to the broad coastline of Libya . . . Thus
even substantial and heavily populated islands are not
the equivalent of continental landmasses in their ability to support claims over adjacent ocean space.249

Another point pertinent to the Paracel Islands is
uninhabitable islands generate territorial waters, but
do not impede the rest of the rights attributed to a larger maritime zone, like an EEZ, that may encompass
it.250 This could apply, for instance, to Triton Island,
which, if it were found to at least meet the status of a
rock, would generate territorial waters for the PRC,
its current controller, that impinge upon Vietnam’s
coastal EEZ. The vague considerations that are taken
into account in determining maritime boundaries and
the other shortcomings of UNCLOS mean that most
dispute settlements tend to be difficult, and usually
considered on a case-by-case basis using precedent as
a guide if submitted for review.251
Regarding their habitability, the Paracel Islands’
conditions have proven harsh for sustaining life. In
their natural state, they are tiny, low, barren islets with
Rocky Island the highest in elevation at 15-m and the
rest not more than 10-m, making them vulnerable to
typhoons and storm surge. The islands lack fresh water
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beyond insufficient seasonal rainfall, and the soil consists primarily of coral, shells, and bird guano in the
form of brown powder or white nodules, at one time
averaging a quarter of a meter deep—little surprise,
then, that the Paracels historically have sustained no
indigenous human population.252 The resulting cost of
the financial and physical commitment by each of the
past occupying states has been high, which explains in
part why the French, Vietnamese, Japanese, and Chinese historically have been parsimonious in stationing
troops in the Paracels.
The nearest case of a disputed South China Sea
feature meeting the requirements for a habitable island may be Woody Island. Less than a square mile in
size, it has a reputed decades-old population of about
1,000 people, consisting of military personnel, civil
servants, and fishermen, most of who have temporary
terms of residency.253 To demonstrate its control over
and habitability of Woody Island, the PRC has made
it an administrative capital, expanded the existing
runway for overseas tourists and surveillance aircraft,
established a new deep water port to handle cruise
liners and maritime enforcement vessels, and built
a desalinization plant, 500-kilowatt solar power station, and environmentally friendly rubbish and waste
water treatment facility for visitors and the increased
garrison. Other improvements reported are a small
700-square-meter vegetable patch and a small coconut
grove.254
How much Woody Island adheres to Van Dyke’s
concept of an island made habitable only through “reverse engineering,” or his proposed criteria of an inhabitable island with a permanent population which,
at a minimum, “provide support for a regular basis
by fisheries from neighboring islands,” is a gray area
that remains one of the main points of disagreement
50

in the region.255 The new principles and definitions
in the 1982 UNCLOS law have stirred problems of
land claims to gain maritime jurisdiction in the South
China Sea, which some commentators believe could
best be managed by declaring the features “legally
uninhabitable”256 or pooling the maritime zones each
might generate to be “shared regionally and managed
by a joint development resource agency.”257 Within
these bookends of open ocean and collective sovereign waters lies a continuum of maritime control by
the coastal states.
Maritime Jurisdictions.
After sovereignty over a geologic feature and its
type are determined, then its maritime jurisdictions
are established through UNCLOS. The Law of the
Sea Treaty determines how much authority a state asserts over neighboring seas as weighted by the type of
land feature it is based upon and its distance from the
coastline. The types of waters that may be assigned
are sovereign internal waters (including closely related archipelagic and historic waters), territorial waters,
contiguous zones, EEZs, sometimes a continental shelf
extension, and the high seas. The high seas are the res
communis, open for use by all states, though regulated
somewhat by both customary law and UNCLOS as to
how activities may be conducted. Examples of regulating the high seas include customary laws against
piracy or slavery, and UNCLOS Part XI rules on the
gathering of nonliving and sedentary resources from
the ocean floor258—objections to the latter has kept
the United States from ratifying the Law of the Sea
Treaty. The boundaries and rights of the littoral zones
are explained in this section in order to better present
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the potential maritime jurisdictions that are claimed in
the Paracel Islands region, and their implications for
U.S. interests.
Internal, Archipelagic, and Historic Sovereign Waters.
The most restrictive maritime zones are internal
waters in which the state has complete sovereignty,
as over its own internal lakes and land. Internal waters are adjacent national waters with access to the sea,
but are inside a series of straight baselines that may
connect barrier islands or cross the mouth of a narrow bay, and thus are treated as under the full sovereignty of the state.259 Smooth coastline states might
rate no internal waters, whereas countries with chains
of nearby fringe islands, like the U.S. eastern seaboard or deeply indented coastline like that found in
Alaska, would have internal waters from the shore to
the straight baseline that connect the outermost part
of these features, as stipulated in Article 7 and subsequent guidance in UNCLOS.260 Applying this law, the
United States has sovereign control over its Intracoastal Waterway on the landward side of the east coast
barrier islands, but has only territorial waters control
on the seaward side of those islands. Establishing a
straight baseline simplifies rugged sea borders and is
advantageous since it not only gains sovereign control over adjacent waters, but also, as its name implies,
moves the line from which other maritime zones are
measured from the shore (or normal baseline) to the
straight baseline, and makes all waters landward from
the straight baseline sovereign internal waters. For
this reason, straight baselines often are drawn liberally, as has been done by the PRC and Vietnam, which
routinely has been physically and diplomatically challenged by the United States as exceeding their right52

ful allowances to attain large swaths of internal water
and extend their maritime zones further to sea.261 The
only exception in UNCLOS to complete sovereignty
over internal waters is to allow innocent passage
across recently drawn straight baselines “which had
not previously been considered as such,” mostly affecting states through whose waters traditional international shipping routes pass.262 While straight
baselines are applied liberally along neighboring continental shores to improve the maritime jurisdiction
that may be claimed from national boundaries, their
use around the Paracel Islands is also “problematic,”
according to Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian diplomat
who was President of the UNCLOS Assembly of the
International Seabed Authority and coordinator of
the informal “Track II” workshops among the South
China Sea disputants.263
A new construct for internal waters found in UNCLOS Part IV is that of archipelagic waters, codified
in part to supersede the thorny concept of historic waters.264 Archipelagic waters specifically were intended
to give fragmented island states, like Indonesia and
the Philippines, authority over the waters within the
confines of their archipelago as defined by its baselines.265 Here, however, the enclosing lines are called
straight archipelagic baselines, and are drawn further
afield than the tips of adjacent craggy peninsulas and
fringe islands. Archipelagic baselines may connect the
outermost features of an archipelago with lines up to
100-nm long to enclose an area of no more than 1 to
9 land-to-water ratio.266 Although the Paracel Islands
themselves are a geographic archipelago, they would
not fall under this legal regime because they are not
a sovereign state, nor may the PRC use archipelagic
rules with the Paracels since the mainland is not a part
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of the archipelago.267 Since archipelagic rules do not
apply in the Paracels, China’s current declaration of
its straight baselines around the Paracels may violate
UNCLOS intent with 5 of 28 lines drawn longer than
24-nm in length.268
Historic claims, beyond those now covered under
archipelagic baseline rules, are also considered internal waters under customary law. Although historic
waters are not officially defined, they are occasionally
referenced in UNCLOS, such as Article 10’s “historic
bays” or Article 15’s reference to “historic title.”269 According to maritime law author L. J. Bouchez, historic
waters are:
waters over which the coastal State, contrary to the
generally applicable rules of international law, clearly,
effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period of time, exercises sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of States.270

Its appeal to states is that historic waters hold the
sovereignty of internal waters, but do not include
the innocent-transit-across-baselines caveat found in
UNCLOS archipelagic waters regime. Thus, attaining
historic waters status restricts freedom of navigation
and curtails the exploitation of oceanic resources by
the international community.271 As preceding law, historic waters may also override UNCLOS statutes by
allowing historic bays wider than 24-nm at the mouth,
for instance, or giving precedence to historic waters
contrary to overlapping territorial water claims which
would otherwise be settled with a median line between them.272 The motivation for a state to claim such
waters is obvious, and both Vietnam and China make
sweeping historic claims to large parts of the South
China Sea, as previously presented.
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Although some commentators assert that historic
claim doctrine is obsolete or at least transitional, these
claims remain very active in practice through the legal
principle of stare decisis.273 Nonetheless, UNCLOS was
written to minimize the use of historic claims, and they
are generally recognized by the international community only in exceptional circumstances.274 As already
demonstrated in the South China Sea, the Vietnamese and Chinese historic claims are not convincingly
documented, lacking the continuity and long-term
exercise of rights recognized by other states as defined by Bouchez. For example, it would be difficult
for a state to claim historic waters where foreign ships
transit on a regular basis as has routinely occurred
around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.275
Some officials in Beijing are reported to recognize that
their sweeping claim for South China Sea historic waters conflicts with UNCLOS, and that they believe a
more appropriate claim is for just the islets within its
U-shaped line with their adjacent waters.276 At least
one commentator believes that Vietnamese officials
are also relenting on claiming historic waters to argue
its claims in terms of UNCLOS EEZ and continental
shelf articles.277 Although not taken seriously by the
international community, historic waters could be a
powerful and excluding disruptor if awarded to any
claimant in the South China Sea.
Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zones.
Close to internal waters in concept and proximity
are the maritime zones of territorial seas and contiguous waters. Territorial seas codify the customary legal
practice of state control over waters within 3-nm of
its shores, but UNCLOS expands this zone to up to
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12-nm from the baseline. Articles 33 and 121 allow every natural feature above the high water mark to have
territorial waters and up to an additional 12-nm for
a contiguous zone, and China and Vietnam have established each of the UNCLOS allowed zones.278 Territorial seas are treated as the coastal state’s sovereign
territory, with exclusive rights to living and nonliving
resources down to and including the seabed, and enforcement of applicable national laws, but they must
still allow innocent passage to transiting foreign vessels.279 The right of innocent passage through territorial waters requires that “the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal State” not be disturbed through
activities like fishing, polluting, information collecting, firing weapons, or launching aircraft or boats in
accordance with Article 19.280 Coastal states may, of
course, prevent noninnocent passage through its territorial waters, and may also temporarily suspend innocent passage by all foreign vessels in specific areas
designated as temporary security zones in its territorial
sea per Article 25.281 The contiguous zone is a nonsovereign transitional area that allows protections for the
coastal state to enforce national laws concerning customs, finance, immigration, and sanitation, but is otherwise governed as part of the less restrictive EEZ.282
Innocent passage is not needed to transit a contiguous
zone. Both zones were established to allow freedom of
navigation to all vessels from any state, and to ensure
good order and control over adjacent waters for the
coastal state.
There are disagreements, however, over whether
innocent passage applies to all vessels or excludes
warships of another state, a U.S. major concern which
relies on innocent passage for power projection. The
1958 convention that preceded UNCLOS clearly al-
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lowed warships innocent passage through territorial
waters, and the drafting history of UNCLOS indicates
the same rights.283 UNCLOS rules for innocent passage
fall under Section 3, Subsection A entitled “Rules Applicable to All Ships,” which states “ships of all States,
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”284 Despite
this rule, China and Vietnam have interpreted innocent passage to exclude warships or their activities,
and protest such transit vigorously.285 Vietnam’s 1980
Enactment No. 30-CP prohibits military ships from
both its territorial sea and contiguous zone without
30 days advanced permission, although its 2012 Law
of the Sea has relaxed the requirement to prior notification.286 Further to sea are the PRC’s permanent restricted maritime military zones, created in the 1960s,
within and outside territorial waters in the Bo Hai
and Yellow Sea.287 Although these zones are north of
the South China Sea, they demonstrate long-standing
Chinese actions that ignore Article 25, and could also
be applied around the Paracel Islands as permanent
political obstructions to any foreign vessel’s passage
in the region.
Chinese policy since the early days of the Republic
in the 1920s, after its harsh history with maritime insecurity, also bars warships’ passage through its territorial seas and contiguous zones without prior consent “to safeguard its national security.”288 This was
first codified in the Declaration of the Government of the
PRC on the Territorial Sea in 1958, and reiterated in the
1992 Law on Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas, both of which explicitly included the Paracel and
Spratly Islands.289 The significance of maritime control
and innocent passage for the PRC explains in part
why China took more than 13 years to ratify UNCLOS
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and the reason for its accompanying reservations.290
The issues of sovereignty and independence are the
PRC’s highest priority in its policy of Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.291 The 1992 territorial waters law
implied, and further actions have shown, that the PRC
will enforce its sovereignty for its claimed Paracel and
Spratly Islands.292 Such sovereign zones, if fully enforced, would mean most or all of the sea out of limits
should China or Vietnam enforce historic rights to the
South China Sea islets or to historic waters.
Exclusive Economic Zones.
An innovation of modern maritime statutory law is
the EEZ, by which states possessing habitable islands
and continental shores economically control up to
200-nm of ocean and seabed from their baseline under
Part V of UNCLOS.293 Unlike territorial seas, however,
there is no state sovereignty over this zone, just the
authority to regulate the environment and natural resources, establish installations, and conduct “marine
scientific research.”294 By controlling such activities,
EEZs are distinguished from the less-restrictive high
seas. Unlike territorial seas, navigation and over-flight
of an EEZ is not subject to the coastal state’s control
except to enforce the authorities allowed by UNCLOS,
such as resource management and pollution control.295
Based on these provisions to manage the EEZ, the
South China Sea states often challenge each other’s
activities in their ambiguous and overlapping claimed
zones, and use their interpretations to restrict operations of foreign military craft (as already presented in
this monograph).
Under customary law, the distances over which
states controlled adjacent waters were short, and the
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amount of overlapping jurisdictions small. When UNCLOS extended the maritime jurisdictions and created
the EEZ, with states 400-nm apart becoming maritime
neighbors, the problem of unilateral and overlapping
EEZ claims in the Paracels resulted.296 In such cases,
delimitation establishes maritime jurisdiction boundaries between states’ valid claims for territorial seas,
contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelf.297 To remove contention from such decisions, the earlier 1958
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea proposed a
line halfway between the coastlines of overlapping jurisdictions, using the equidistance principle to delimit
disputed areas that could not otherwise be settled.298
However, in the 1970s, this straightforward method
was modified in international court judgments that
found even habitable lands may each carry different
weight in the generation of maritime zones based on
the length of their coastlines.299 Of course, where no
overlap occurs all habitable islands receive full maritime zones, but when small islands’ jurisdictions abut
larger islands, or larger islands’ zones overlap continental landmasses, the smaller feature will receive
less than full effect depending on each circumstance.300
Weighing the amount of jurisdiction awarded in disputes to the more significant land formation is the essence of the current equitable principle, which ensures
the amount of area awarded in an EEZ is proportional
to the length of the coastlines involved, and not usually influenced by economic, ecological, or other
characteristics.301
The awarding of an EEZ using these rules is important in the Paracel Islands because of the consequences
for regional economic development and international
navigation. Unlike territorial seas and contiguous
zones, economically unviable rocks do not generate
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an EEZ or a continental shelf claim.302 Under these
conditions, an exposed rock would become an enclave
of territorial waters for one state surrounded by the
high seas or the EEZ of another state’s nearby eligible
landmass.303 Since Vietnam and China claim 200-nm
EEZs from their baselines, their EEZ claims conflict
over controlling the region’s maritime resources outside of the territorial waters given to eligible geologic
features. Thus, Vietnam’s EEZ would regulate the
seas south of the Paracel Islands, and China’s would
regulate the seas around the northern features.304 Since
Vietnam included no EEZ from its claimed Paracel
and Spratly Islands in its 2009 EEZ and continental
shelf submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, its government may have
determined that these land features are uninhabitable under the legal definition and merit only territorial seas.305 This interpretation leaves an approximate
700-nm long band of high seas in the South China Sea
stretching from 150-nm northwest of Woody Island to
parts of Rifleman Bank in the southwestern Spratlys,
which would be governed only by UNCLOS Article
87, the Freedom of the High Seas section, and the International Seabed Authority for sea floor resources.306
China’s efforts on Woody Island, however, are meant
to prove that it is habitable, which, if true, would
garner China more water column and seabed in the
South China Sea through its Paracel occupation. Perhaps to maintain its options concerning the islands’
habitability, Vietnam only made a partial submission of its UNCLOS EEZ and continental shelf claims,
and may yet make further claims from its islands.307
When interpreted under the intent of UNCLOS, establishment of EEZs is relatively straightforward in the
Paracels’ region.
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Should PRC-occupied Woody Island be determined a habitable island, an EEZ complication arises.
Woody Island’s position on the edges of the Vietnamese and Chinese EEZs mean it would probably
generate little EEZ to its north and southwest against
continental EEZs, although that would be determined
by treaty, arbitration, or international court decision.
However, to the east, Woody Island could generate
an EEZ in the waters of the erstwhile high seas of
the northern South China Sea.308 This additional EEZ
would transfer about 40,000 square-nm from existing
high seas to China’s jurisdiction, including all of the
shallow Macclesfield Bank from which it could derive
the increased fishing and drilling potential associated
with one of the world’s largest sunken atolls.309 In
line with Chinese law, this enlarged EEZ would also
increase China’s naval buffer zone, since it prohibits
foreign government vessels’ transit rights in its EEZ
without prior permission. In 2000, China and Vietnam
negotiated a delimitation agreement, settling over a
century of disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin, along with a
fishing protocol, which both took effect in 2004.310 This
negotiation is a promising sign toward the resolution
of overlapping claims.
If Vietnamese or Chinese historic claims are validated as internal waters, EEZs would be of diminished consequence since these sovereign seas would
impinge upon the lesser authorities of an EEZ. Two
vexing examples of such overlap come from China’s
exploration and drilling activities within Vietnam’s
EEZ in the southern South China Sea, starting in 1992
with the Crestone Block and continuing as recently
as June 2012 with CNOOC calling for bids on blocks
within 37-nm of Vietnam. China substantiates these
activities through its historic claim, and they are the
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cause of many of the clashes between China and Vietnam.311 China disregards Vietnamese maritime claims
that conflicts with its own, exploiting resources within
Vietnam’s claimed EEZ while it protests when other
states transit China’s own EEZ claims.312 In China’s
view, “a claim derived from historic rights may seem
more forceful and valid in law than claims simply
based upon the EEZ concept,” and even if jurisdiction
based on historical claims is rejected, they still offer
the potential for other historic rights—like access to
traditional fishing areas—that cannot be otherwise
attained through UNCLOS methods.313 The combinations of customary and statutory maritime laws with
different national interpretations lead to a wide variance in the amount of control that may result, but
gaining possession of the Paracels or some historical
claim may garner considerable jurisdiction in the surrounding waters.
In addition to the delimitation of the EEZ, how it is
enforced is also very important to the United States. In
their implementing domestic laws, both the PRC and
ROC claim a 200-nm EEZ and accompanying rights
to regulate it under UNCLOS.314 Should China start
enforcing an EEZ around Woody Island or other occupied features in the Paracels, it would challenge foreign military vessels and aircraft to seek permission to
operate within this expanded EEZ as it now does in its
mainland EEZ.315 China is essentially applying rights
that apply in territorial seas to its EEZ. Through its
claimed historic rights of special security interests and
application of UNCLOS, the PRC requires that activities should “refrain from any threat or use of force” in
the EEZ (the intent of UNCLOS definition on transit
passage under Part III on straits navigation).316 China
treats its EEZ as a military buffer zone, contending
that U.S. military surveillance ships and reconnais62

sance flights violate the spirit of UNCLOS and China’s
historic rights in the South China Sea and seek to restrict such activities.317 Thus PRC laws maintain peace
in its EEZ by barring foreign military vessels, citing
UNCLOS Article 58 which directs that states “should
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal State in accordance with the provision of this
Convention.”318 If the coastal state’s laws are disputed,
Chinese scholars declare that deference be given to the
PRC per Article 59, “taking into account the respective
importance of the interests involved to the parties as
well as to the international community as a whole.”319
The United States rejects this interpretation, resulting in the PRC’s restriction of the freedom of navigation through an EEZ, contending it is a minority
view held by only 27 of the 161 ratifying states (significantly, Vietnam is also one of the states enforcing
a restrictive EEZ).320 Focusing on one particularly irksome activity, Chinese officials place “military survey
and military information gathering . . . into the category of ocean scientific research which requires prior
permission from the coastal states,” thereby supplementing its objections based on regulating peace and
security in adjacent waters.321 By applying maritime
law in this way, the PRC uses “international law as an
adjunct to their military forces to achieve anti-access
maritime objectives.”322 The triple problem of whether
its occupied Paracel Islands can generate an EEZ, the
amount of EEZ such features would gain against the
neighboring larger landmasses, and whether foreign
military vessels or certain activities are barred from
an EEZ, make this a very tenuous legal argument for
China.323 However, it could be useful justification for
keeping U.S. vessels out of the South China Sea from
a security stand point, which China could then better
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defend militarily than legally. Both China and Vietnam’s contentions that bar military vessels put them
in a minority position within the international community, unless ever-evolving international sentiment
calls again for a change to the Law of the Sea Treaty.
Continental Shelf Claims.
Although not a jurisdiction that includes a water
column like the spaces discussed previously, the UNCLOS continental shelf zone is important to adjacent
states for the management of nonliving resources and
sedentary species on and under the seabed. Extended
claims for adjacent ocean floor began with the United
States in 1945, and the concept was subsequently incorporated in Article I of the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf with a limit of 200-m isobaths or
the depth of exploitability.324 By 1969, the ICJ instituted the “natural prolongation principle,” which acknowledged that states had jurisdiction over a much
extended continental shelf, although not necessarily
from islets or minor coastal features.325 The resulting
UNCLOS articles updating this extended authority
were a compromise that allowed coastal states to control the surrounding seabed to the natural length of
its continental shelf or to a maximum of 350-nm from
the baseline, and also gave geographically challenged
states with little adjacent continental shelf at least a
200-nm EEZ that also controlled the seabed below it.326
Under UNCLOS, states do not need to exploit or occupy the continental shelf to retain exclusive economic
rights to its seabed, which includes protrusions from
the seabed floor that remain submerged.327 In Articles
78 and 79, however, it is clear that rights to the continental shelf do not affect the superjacent waters or
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airspace above it in order to allow navigation and the
unfettered laying of submarine cables and pipelines.328
The states around the South China Sea supported this
greater control over their continental shelf that UNCLOS gave them, and have used it to their economic
and political advantage.329
These rights over the more distant areas from the
claimants’ shores come with more obligations than
other UNCLOS zones in how they are delimited. Here,
the claiming state must first scientifically stake the extent of its continental shelf beyond 200-nm with the
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
which then must qualify it for technical compliance.330
This is an exacting process that must be completed
within 10 years of ratification of UNCLOS. The Commission cannot qualify an extended continental shelf
claim, however, if it is part of a territorial or maritime
disagreement with another state.331 Consent from the
other involved states can be difficult to obtain in the
contentious South China Sea environment, as seen in
the 2009 joint Vietnamese-Malaysian continental shelf
submission to which the PRC and the Philippines objected.332 Further complicating delimitation of a continental shelf is the potential divergence of an EEZ
water column from the continental shelf below it with
each assigned to a different jurisdiction.333 This may
occur when the EEZs of a continental state and small
island do not overlap, but the natural continental shelf
extends out to undercut the island’s EEZ, or when so
negotiated. Split continental shelf and superjacent
EEZ ownership are uncommon, and no resolution in
the South China Sea has resorted to this yet; however,
it is a possibility in the corner of Asia in which the Paracels are located.334 These continental shelf rules make
already intricate circumstances around the Paracel Islands that much more difficult to resolve.
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Based on the UNCLOS definition of the extent of
the continental shelf, the Paracels are located on a
shelf at the 2,500-m depth level that deepens just to
the northeast and southeast of the islands.335 Using the
complicated mechanism found in UNCLOS Article 76,
Vietnam’s declared continental shelf begins about 50nm southeast of the center of Macclesfield Bank (but
does not include the bank) and runs southwest until it
joins Vietnam’s claimed EEZ line approximately 250nm due east of Phan Thiet, which approximates the
equidistant line between Vietnam and the Philippines.
A dotted line labeled as equidistant line on the SRV’s
submitted delimitation map connects its continental
shelf line starting point to the southeast corner of the
Paracels where it joins the intersection of the Chinese
EEZ from Hainan Dao and the Vietnamese EEZ from
near Quang Ngai around Bombay Reef.336 This line
does not recognize Chinese sovereignty or, at least,
the habitability of the Paracels, which would mandate
the use of a different line.
The PRC has made no similar declaration of its
continental shelf in the South China Sea. However,
such a claim might be hypothesized for China based
upon its 2012 declaration in the East China Sea along
the Okinawa Trough, which, when compared against
a CIA map’s presumed continental shelf limit and applied from Hainan Dao in the Paracels region, would
indicate that the natural Chinese continental shelf
does not extend as far as the Paracels themselves.337
If the Chinese continental shelf physically falls short
of the Paracels, its EEZ nonetheless has legal jurisdiction out to 200-nm from Hainan Dao, which describes
an arc ending east of the Paracels. This means all of
the islets are encompassed by a Chinese or Vietnamese EEZ.338 Extending the aforementioned equidistant
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line from Vietnam’s northernmost claimed continental shelf point to the intersection of their EEZs around
Bombay Shoal to the southernmost point of their Gulf
of Tonkin maritime boundary line—as agreed to by
treaty in 2000—fairly splits this marine domain between China and Vietnam by using the equidistance
principle.339 This equitable division, however, puts
the southern Crescent Islands in Vietnam’s EEZ, thus
opening the possibility that Chinese controlled islets
rating 12-nm territorial seas, such as Triton or Money
Islands, would carve holes into Vietnam’s EEZ. Put
another way, Vietnam’s EEZ would intrude between
China’s Paracel Islands if the claimed straight archipelagic baselines encompassing them are deemed invalid.340 Fortunately, between the deal for White Dragon
Tail Island in 1957 and the delimitation of their shared
Gulf of Tonkin border in 2000, communist Vietnam is
the only state to have negotiated successfully maritime
territory or boundary disputes with the PRC, offering
the potential to do so again through an equitable division of their EEZ around the Paracels.341
This maritime jurisdiction overlap would be further complicated if Woody Island is found to be habitable. A legally habitable Woody Island would exert
little change on the Vietnamese and Chinese equitable
EEZ and continental shelf already described, based on
the precedent of the Libya vs. Malta Case by the ICJ in
1985.342 As previously explained, however, a habitable
Woody Island could claim EEZ jurisdiction in the high
seas of the northern South China Sea, significantly
extending the reach of its occupying state to include
Macclesfield Bank about 150-nm to the southeast.
Since China and some of the Southeast Asian states—
though not Vietnam—make territorial claims to submerged features in the South China Sea, rather than
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exerting maritime jurisdictional control over them as
stipulated in UNCLOS, controlling a habitable Woody
Island would also lay territorial claim to Macclesfield
Bank under application of the Chinese interpretation
of UNCLOS.343 Although hypothetical, should China
win recognition of its possession of the Paracels, receive a habitability determination for Woody Island,
and continue its doctrine of claiming underwater features, China’s claimed EEZ would extend across half
of the South China Sea, by which it could restrict passage of foreign naval vessels into a bottleneck through
its interpretation of restrictions in its EEZ.
However, as with the other forms of claims, these
Chinese maritime claims have serious weaknesses.
The first weakness is legal since, despite these Chinese
interpretations, much of the international community
does not recognize sovereignty claims to territory
made through UNCLOS, a purpose for which it was
not intended.344 A more vexing problem is the ill-defined Chinese historic claim which could trump other
customary and UNCLOS claims in the region. China’s
historic claim within its South China Sea U-shaped line
includes all surface and sub-surface features.345 This
encompassing claim squarely conflicts with EEZ and
continental shelf claims made by each of the ASEAN
South China Sea rim states.346 For instance, as early
as 1992, the PRC created the Crestone oil exploration
block around Vanguard and Prince of Wales Banks (in
the southwestern South China Sea within 200-nm of
the Vietnamese baseline) in order to drill within what
is otherwise Vietnamese jurisdiction.347 Such liberties
persisted into 2012 when CNOOC offered nine blocks
for oil and gas exploration within 37-nm of Vietnam
(though it did not receive many international bids).348
Elsewhere in the South China Sea, China’s historic
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claim extends as far south as within 100-nm of Malaysia to include North and South Luconia Shoals,
Friendship Shoals, and James Shoals; Scarborough
Shoal in the Philippine EEZ, 130-nm from Subic Bay;
and the entire Spratly Islands Group, which China
disputes with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the
Philippines.349 To defend its broad claims, China has
disputed each continental shelf submission made to
the UNCLOS Commission concerning the South China Sea,350 and as one Chinese scholar reminds other
powers: “[They] should understand that the Convention [UNCLOS] is just one of the international
laws of the sea, not the only one, and thus should
stop questioning the legitimacy of China’s 9-dashed
[U-shaped] line.”351
If negotiated in good faith, the maritime jurisdictions of the EEZ and continental shelf around the Paracel Islands could be resolved based on coastal baseline
claims, even if sovereignty over the islands themselves
remains a more difficult issue. The impingement of
historical claims against UNCLOS-derived claims
magnifies this problem from around the Paracels to
throughout the South China Sea. The amount of high
seas seabed available in the South China Sea is of interest to the United States since these areas are exploitable
for their resource wealth by any state, and maximizing the availability of deep sea regions and economic
return from them is one of the major factors hindering
the United States from ratifying UNCLOS. Should the
overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims become
national jurisdictions, they would remove all the high
seas in the South China Sea.352 Thus the extended continental shelf disputes and their resolution will remain
a point for the United States to monitor and influence
to maintain its own interests and set precedents to
its liking.
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Territorial and Jurisdiction Claim Summary.
As a “semi-enclosed sea” dominated by overlapping maritime claims, the South China Sea bordering
countries are enjoined by UNCLOS Article 123 to “cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights
and performance of their duties” beyond that normally expected of other maritime states.353 The shared nature of migratory fish resources, indistinct location of
energy sites and advent of lateral drilling, cumulative
effect of environmental damage, competing territorial
claims and rights, and tight confines that result in confused and conflicting maritime jurisdictions, demonstrate why cooperation is an ideal, if unrealized, goal
in the South China Sea.354 Although a few diplomatic
advances to address these myriad regional concerns
have been made along the sea’s periphery, the states
have more often adhered to customary and statuary
legal principles that best favor their respective geopolitical positions.355 Under this system, the coveted
maritime zones of territorial seas, contiguous zones,
EEZs, and extended continental shelves depend upon
the determination of sovereignty over, and classification of, claimed land features, which is the core of the
South China Sea islands disputes.356 The by-product of
demonstrating effective sovereign control and administration over these claims, unfortunately, has sometimes resulted in aggressive and violent enforcement
of national laws and perceived international rights,
which makes this an important issue to address in order to prevent miscommunication, accident, or impatience to justify the use of force to settle the disputes.
Until now, however, the disputants have mainly
resorted to making outsized claims to maximize any
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future negotiated outcome, or strengthen their cases
before going to arbitration or a tribunal.357 China and
Vietnam have asserted sovereignty through discovery
and occupation, the most internationally accepted legal method,358 and in this the PRC reigns as the current
sole occupier of the Paracel archipelago. Vietnam and
China also make ill-defined historic claims as another
approach to territory, waters, or rights; this method
is not well regarded by the international community
and, in its collective judgment, lacks sufficient documentation in its application.359 Under UNCLOS principles, the straight baselines declared by both countries
along their mainland coasts probably exceed their
authority, and the resulting excessive internal waters
and maritime zones are protested by the United States
and other countries. China’s attempt at using archipelagic rules to establish a baseline around the Paracels also exceeds the intent of UNCLOS. None of the
economically unproductive Paracels may themselves
generate extended maritime zones; if some could,
they probably would be given diminished domain
against larger land masses under the equitable principle, thereby greatly reducing their significance and
the importance of sovereignty over them.360 Although
China and Vietnam have ratified UNCLOS, each also
takes exception to its settlement mechanisms and
other select provisions that reduce the overall effectiveness of the treaty to reconcile maritime disputes.361
Thus, although they often frame their claims and defense of those claims in terms of legal principles, neither China nor Vietnam has been willing to adjudicate
their differences through existing arbitration or court
structures, instead they are looking for a negotiated or
political solution over which they have more control
in determining results.362
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U.S. INTERESTS AND RESPONSES TO THE
ISSUES AROUND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
REGION
With this background established, it is clear that
events in the South China Sea affect important U.S.
interests. The information given thus far was presented to better inform policymakers about the involved
states’ diplomatic, military, police, and legal issues
and actions. The issues are complex and contradictory, meaning any U.S. involvement needs to be wellinformed and nuanced. This section reviews the most
relevant U.S. interests in the South China Sea region
in terms of freedom of navigation, economic activities, and the competing U.S. roles of honest brokering for peace and stability among the disputants and
regional balancing of power for its security partners.
Without maritime jurisdiction or territorial claims of
its own in the South China Sea—but strong interests in
how these issues are resolved—U.S. involvement by
necessity is mostly indirect support and grounded in
international law, but it is also motivated by a political
component. Based on these interests, this monograph
makes a few recommendations on how the United
States may positively influence the situation in the
South China Sea to enhance its interests and those of
the disputants. Due to the underlying nature of this
situation, these recommendations emphasize the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of U.S.
power over military ones.
Although President Barack Obama’s administration again made the Asia-Pacific region a top U.S.
priority in 2012, this region has been a major U.S. economic and security focus since Commodore Matthew
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Perry opened Japan in 1854.363 In particular, five important U.S. global interests are represented there today: protecting free and unimpeded commerce in the
global commons, securing peace and stability among
the states, supporting diplomacy and rules-based conduct, ensuring the U.S. military’s freedom to operate
in compliance with international law, and supporting
U.S. allies and defense partners.364 Then Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton reiterated these interests specifically for the South China Sea region at the ARF in July
2010, emphasizing that:
The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s
maritime commons, and respect for international law
in the South China Sea. . . . The United States supports
a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for
resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the
competing territorial disputes over land features in
the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to
maritime space in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Consistent with customary
international law, legitimate claims to maritime space
in the South China Sea should be derived solely from
legitimate claims to land features.365

To achieve these goals, Secretary Clinton emphasized the need to cooperate in areas of common interest
in trade, peace, security, and transnational problems
like climate change and nuclear proliferation, especially with China.366 However as an interested party,
the United States is also maintaining a relatively balanced playing field because recent clashes in the South
China Sea jeopardize “vital national interests of the

73

United States,” as Senator John McCain and then Senator John Kerry observed to Dai Bingguo, China’s Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs,367 and U.S. involvement
might make it a “little bit easier for the governments
in the region to acquire the necessary political will” to
resolve their disputes.368 Increased U.S. involvement
may have spurred negotiations in July 2011 when the
PRC agreed with Vietnam to implement long-delayed
guidelines to govern their disagreements, if for no
other reason than to limit U.S. involvement.369 In short,
the United States seeks to ensure the legal rights that it
and the international community should enjoy in the
region, support the legitimate interests of its regional
partners, and act upon common ground with China
and other involved states to their mutual benefit to
improve stability and prosperity in the region.370
U.S. Freedom of Navigation Interests.
The issue of immediate concern for the United
States, because it may be the most volatile and the first
national interest listed by Secretary Clinton, is freedom of navigation.371 Since UNCLOS was under negotiation in 1979, the U.S. global Freedom of Navigation
Program seeks to dispute excessive sea and airspace
claims perceived to violate international law by challenging them diplomatically and physically.372 China
and Vietnam hold restrictive passage views concerning their coastal home waters—potentially China will
also hold these views in its claimed territorial waters,
contiguous zones, and EEZs around the Paracel Islands. These positions place it at odds with most other
states’ open-use positions, and, as a precedent threatens, EEZ navigation rights around the world.373 On
the other hand, China sees this as an excuse for the
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United States to intervene in South China Sea issues,
and protests, for instance, U.S. exercises with Vietnam
and other powers in the South China Sea.374 The PRC
has more aggressively and consistently enforced EEZ
restrictions than any other state, threatening freedom
of navigation for all maritime states and risking armed
clashes and instability, especially when backed by its
advanced anti-access and area-denial capabilities.375
After the 1995 PRC occupation of Mischief Reef in the
midst of the Philippine EEZ, the United States made
clear its stance for freedom of navigation throughout
the South China Sea, and in 1998 specifically sent a
carrier battle group near the Spratly Islands to assert
American prerogatives.376 As recently as 2012, after
the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, Philippine Foreign
Secretary Albert del Rosario wondered about China’s
aggressive stance and the future of “freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce in the [South China
Sea].”377 Thus the United States considers these rights
important for itself and for other interested parties378
Despite these chronic tensions, with the growth
of prosperity in the region, the need for stability and
security, and the pursuit of other common interests,
the perspective of each party may start to converge in
settling their differences. The United States has made
progress toward this with Vietnam through a code
of conduct concerning activities on the South China
Sea, negotiations on navigation, and improved military ties.379 This better understanding may have contributed to Vietnam relaxing its coastal EEZ transit
requirements in 2012 to be more in accordance with
UNCLOS standards.380 Like Vietnam, as the PRC’s
economy grows and its international commitments
expand, China’s interests may converge with the U.S.
global views in balancing broad international mari-
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time rights with the coastal state rights that China
now favors.381 The PRC is the world’s largest exporter
and second largest importer of goods, and thus highly
depends on the maritime commons to keep its economy growing, and it has prospered from the open shipping order assured by U.S. naval power. However, as
China’s dependence on seaborne trade continues, it
may want to protect its own shipping and sea lines
of communication rather than rely on its partner and
competitor, the United States, to do so.382 With among
the largest merchant marine fleets and navies in the
world, China’s perspective should transition to accept
the majority interpretation of UNCLOS—this means
more open use of sea jurisdictions and a conventional
interpretation of coastal states’ rights in its EEZ and
territorial sea. In 2012, PLAN vessels conducted surveillance in the U.S. EEZs around Guam and Hawaii,
the latter during a naval exercise, thus experimenting
with a more open interpretation of conducting military activities in a foreign EEZ.383 Indeed U.S. interests
also seem to be evolving toward embracing stronger
coastal states’ rights in its own EEZ for economic and
environmental protection, thus converging interests
may make resolving this issue easier over time and
helping to enable some of the suggestions below.384
To spur this convergence of interests, specific steps
should be taken by the United States to defuse the
freedom of navigation issue, especially when the most
active differences lie with China. The United States
could back away from its insistence on exercising its
rights to navigate in the South China Sea and its coastal waters in order to ease chronic tensions on this issue. This action was recently recommended by former
U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
and debated among scholars, but doing this for long
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could needlessly weaken the U.S. and other states’
worldwide commitment to UNCLOS open-sea provisions.385 Instead, as the PRC takes a more involved role
in ensuring stability and security in the international
commons, the United States should work with China
to establish a common understanding on maritime
rights in coastal waters and abroad since that is ultimately in both of their interests. The United States
and China already have the 1998 Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement to prevent incidents between
them, and—though quite imperfectly applied—it is a
useful confidence-building measure.386 In April 2014,
the United States, the PRC, and 19 other Western Pacific naval powers approved a new code of conduct
for naval encounters in disputed areas, the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). However, the
code is not legally binding and PLAN officials themselves question whether China will fully observe it.387
To better tie the PRC to safe conduct protocols, then,
the next step should follow the lead of the 1972 U.S.Soviet Union Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA).388
This is a successful tool that avoided negative encounters between the two powers, yet complied with international law covering activities like innocent passage
through coastal jurisdictions. Through uniform procedures both sides may follow and observe the other’s
ships, but could not interfere with their lawful passage, regardless of prior notification, cargo, arms, or
type of propulsion.389 An INCSEA agreement would
overlap similar multilateral agreements, but those
do not address the specific differences in interpretation between the two countries, nor contain all of the
tools available in INCSEA. The mere act of negotiating such a confidence building-measure (and recognizing China as a rising power in the process) could
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also help soothe this sometimes difficult relationship
and emphasize that such issues are not unique to the
United States and China.390 INCSEA is a practical,
tested method which could be tailored to reduce tensions, support both sides’ long-term interests, and accelerate a process of confidence-building between the
two within the contentious South China Sea without
foregoing the precepts of UNCLOS.391
Other forms of cooperation, both military and civilian, could also help build better understanding and
trust and work toward common interests like stability, counter crime, and freedom of navigation in the
region as envisioned by Secretary Clinton.392 A telling
example follows the major 2009 incident involving the
USS Impeccable, after which such incidents decreased
in part because both sides realized that cooperation on
issues like North Korea and the global economic recession were more important interests they shared.393
While many disputes over issues like Taiwan and
military surveillance in the EEZ persist, both sides can
build much needed trust and cooperation through existing military and civilian programs like the MMCA,
and broaden to new ones to work through their differences. Existing programs to build upon include the
Sino-U.S. Maritime Security Consultation mechanism,
the Annual Defense Affairs Consultation mechanism,
and the Container Security Initiative signed in 2003 to
combat terrorism.394 Recent combined sea exercises
held an anti-piracy drill off the coast of Somalia in
2012 and a search and rescue exercise around Hawaii
in 2013, each meant to “build trust, encourage cooperation, enhance transparency, and avoid miscalculation.”395 Because of their nature, some new initiatives
would be easier to implement, such as information
exchanges on piracy and terrorism, and maritime di-
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saster mitigation plans. With increased understanding
and trust, combined personnel training for humanitarian missions or counterterrorism could follow, with
standardized procedures for data and awareness-sharing developed between them.396 These could directly
improve relations and indirectly support freedom of
navigation and are actions that the U.S. administration and Congress could support with both China and
the Southeast Asian states.397
The most promising military cooperation with
China has been through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
which may be a more politically acceptable partner for
other governments when emphasizing its enforcement
and rescue over its military roles.398 The various Chinese maritime enforcement agencies and the USCG
have already enjoyed cooperative success through the
multilateral North Pacific Coast Guard Forum; student
training exchanges; detailing Chinese officers aboard
USCG cutters in the North Pacific for enforcement actions against Chinese fishermen; and combined bilateral and multilateral exercises in port security, search
and rescue, and law enforcement. In 2006, the USCG
established permanent liaisons with maritime agencies in four Chinese ministries, solidifying a good
working relationship with each.399 Continuing this relationship, in 2013, a group of retired American admirals and maritime experts met with Chinese officials
during the formative stage of the Chinese Maritime
Surveillance Force to discuss its operations as a professional coast guard.400 The U.S. Coast Guard offers
other venues of cooperation and confidence-building,
such as sharing its global expertise in protecting port
and energy loading operations with Chinese authorities, whose country relies heavily on the safe and secure conduct of maritime energy shipments.401 Coast
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Guard cooperation with China is a model to expand
to increase understanding and reduce tensions about
issues both sides deem imperative.
The Department of Defense (DoD) should also play
a role in establishing trust and cooperation between the
United States, China, and Vietnam. A DoD-wide program to encourage military-to-military engagement
through regionally aligned forces under U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) integration would implement
security assistance to enhance the military capabilities of the region’s states. This should allow Vietnam
and the other ASEAN countries in the South China
Sea disputes to negotiate in a more level environment,
build regional understanding with guidance from the
Department of State, and strengthen bilateral relations for the United States to act as an honest broker.
Regionally aligned forces entail specific units receiving training about a particular area before deploying
there, and they may be assigned in military-to-military partnerships resulting in a better understanding
by U.S. forces of local cultures, languages, geography,
forces, and challenges.402 U.S. units and individuals
gain insight and establish enduring personal relations
through training-focused visits in platoon to brigade
size units.403 This approach in Southeast Asia makes
sense, especially since China is the most likely U.S.
peer rival so that repeated engagement with the PRC
and its neighbors should build trust, reduce tensions,
address differences in fields like maritime access, and
establish the United States as a regional conciliator.
An emphasis on using land forces for such engagement is needed because the new Air-Sea Battle
doctrine concept parcels high-end missions like countering anti-access/area denial to the Air Force and
Navy in the U.S. role of balancing China’s power by
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supporting and protecting the interests of allies and
partners in the region. Expanding theater engagement
using regionally aligned forces also makes sense since
armies tend to dominate the region’s defense forces in
terms of budgets, leadership, and influence. It is left to
the land forces and coast guard, playing a smaller part
in the defense of the South China Sea region, to support the conciliator role by building trust, capability,
and relationships through the Army, Marine Corps,
and special operations forces as proposed by former
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.404 Land forces up to brigade size can be tailored to
support ASEAN states through security cooperation
activities without threatening China directly because
of the fragmented physical geography and the defensive nature of U.S. land forces in the region.405
A more robust regime of exercising, education
exchanges, and contingency planning for events of
importance to both the United States and the PRC
could slowly influence the PLA to better understand
American positions and influence the United States to
better understand Chinese positions, thus overcoming
historic and geopolitical distrust. As one of the major
arbiters over the freedom of navigation dispute within the Chinese system, better relations with the PLA
would be helpful in resolving this and other issues
both sides face. For U.S. Army forces, upon which
the brunt of regional specialization would fall, this
alignment concept follows the vision imperative in
the Army Chief of Staff’s 2012 Army Strategic Planning
Guidance: “Provide modernized and ready, tailored
land force capabilities to meet Combatant Commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.”406 To improve engagement with the PLA and
the other armies of the region, PACOM was raised to a
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four star component command in 2013.407 The benefits
of regionally aligned forces include more effective
interactions and support, improved U.S. understanding and interoperability during multinational actions,
and better understanding by both sides to allow the
United States more access and influence with partners
and competitors alike.408
Elements of this regionally aligned force proposal
exist in the U.S. Army with Special Operations and
National Guard units already aligned to the Pacific
region, and with the Army soon adding active duty
conventional forces as well. Special Forces units have
long specialized to build their competence in the
world’s regions as advisors and operators to improve
partner states’ capabilities and build interoperability and trusted relationships. The 1st Special Forces
(SF) Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, currently
operates under Special Operations Command Pacific,
covering Southeast Asia, China, and the rest of the Pacific region along with the U.S. Army National Guard
19th SF Group headquartered in Draper, Utah.409 U.S.
Army civil affairs (CA) units also specialize to provide
civil-military expertise to conventional forces during
theater engagement and full spectrum military operations. The active duty 84th CA Battalion (CAB) at
Joint Base Lewis-McCord (JBLM), Washington State,
and 97th CAB at Fort Bragg also align with PACOM,
as does the Army Reserve 364th CA Brigade in Portland, Oregon.410 In 2014, as part of its greater regional
alignment initiative, the U.S. Army plans to assign a
soon-to-be designated conventional unit from I Corps,
headquartered at JBLM, to support PACOM security
cooperation and partnership building activities.411
Reserve component forces, when regionally specialized, offer advantages to include greater personnel
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stability, unique civilian expertise, and some military
skills not residing in the active forces, and have thus
been particularly effective at achieving high levels of
trust, understanding, and cooperation with partners.412
In PACOM, there are three long-term State Partnership
Programs with Southeast Asian states, including the
Hawaii and Guam Army National Guard partnered
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines since 2000;
the Hawaii National Guard also partnered with the
Indonesian National Armed Forces in 2006;413 and the
Vietnamese military (Vietnam People’s Army or PAV)
and Oregon National Guard partnered in 2012.414 The
nature of the new PAV and Oregon National Guard
partnership is manifest in the composition of the first
Vietnamese planning delegation to Oregon in April
2013, led by an army lieutenant general and included
experts in law, marine shipping, economics, medicine, port and maritime security, search and rescue,
and humanitarian aid.415 These partnerships facilitate
stability and national interests by building partner
capacity through exchanging military skills and experience, professional development, exercising, and
interagency cooperation.416
This partnership is the latest step in a slowly evolving relationship between Vietnam and the United
States. Following the Indochina Wars, U.S.-SRV diplomatic recognition began in 1995 with a decade of tepid
and technical military interaction. However, as understanding between the two former enemies overcame
their suspicions, their interactions grew. The first U.S.
Navy port call visit to Vietnam occurred in 2003, followed in 2005 with increased training through the International Military Education and Training program
and sharing of intelligence on terrorism and transnational crime.417 These military capacity-building ac-
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tivities contributed to Vietnam seeking closer defense
ties with the United States to hedge China’s growing
power, as demonstrated with the deployment of a U.S.
aircraft carrier to Vietnam for combined naval exercises in 2011.418 Both sides also agreed to cooperate
through periodic high-level meetings, maritime security, search and rescue, discussion about peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
which the establishment of the State Partnership Program should advance.419
As U.S. global strategy emphasizes the Asia-Pacific
region, more closely aligning land forces supporting
PACOM’s security and engagement plans is a needed
initiative for peacetime-shaping operations in order
to resort less to direct intervention.420 However, in an
era of fiscal austerity, these needed efforts must be
adequately sustained and kept efficient to make them
viable, be allowed time to take root and grow, and be
protected against short-term budget cuts and competing strategic options.421 One easy-to-correct flaw in
the active duty conventional unit regional alignment
scheme is that units are assigned to support a region
for 1 year, unlike the longer-term assignments of SF,
CA, and National Guard units.422 Such an arrangement
will not build adequate regional expertise, personal
relations, or continuity in training and operations to
achieve combatant command requirements. Even
though active duty unit personnel change more often
than reserve component personnel, the institutional
links nonetheless remain important, and active duty
units should be assigned long-term regional commitments at the brigade or battalion levels. Another
consideration for the Army is that, as deployments
to Central Command decrease, more units should be
regionally aligned to PACOM to allow them to focus
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on a sub-region like the states bordering the South
China Sea.423 The current scheme has SF, CA, and conventional forces supporting PACOM from Mongolia
to New Zealand, which dilutes the merits of regional
specialization. Units assigned to smaller regions or
even to critical countries like Vietnam, as done in the
State Partnership Program, allow deeper understanding of the region, richer and more frequent contacts
with a targeted group of key people, and improved
continuity in programs. These alignment efforts would
improve U.S. contributions to stability and security in
the South China Sea region.
Other U.S. military services also engage in military-to-military activities in the region, although not
regionally aligning units as well as some parts of the
Army. The U.S. Navy held its fourth annual Naval
Engagement Activity with Vietnam in April 2013 as
part of a destroyer and rescue and salvage ship port
call to Da Nang, which focused on noncombat events
like search and rescue, medicine, diving and salvage
operations, and seamanship skills.424 The Marine
Corps Security Training Group (MCSCG) builds partner-nation military capacity by advising U.S. units
and participating countries on security training and
organization, especially with units sharing a similar
maritime or expeditionary mission.425 Although MCSCG-trained units have completed some training in
PACOM, more emphasis on key states like Vietnam—
similar to that given in Africa and Latin America—is
needed through regionally aligned forces that would
better support both sides in their mutual training and
engagement goals.426 Theater engagement activities
are an important part of PACOM’s theater security
cooperation plan using all of the military services in
pursuit of U.S. national interests.
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Regional alignment and specialization of units to
engaging and shaping tasks does come with problems
and challenges. First is to get the affected countries to
accept more U.S. involvement, and hence influence, of
this type. Although its past ties and an insurgent threat
made the Philippines an early and enthusiastic supporter of recent U.S. engagement activities, Vietnam
has been a late and careful participant because of its
need to balance U.S. overtures with its complicated relationship with China and its adversarial history with
the United States. For these reasons, U.S.-Vietnamese
military cooperation should continue incrementally
along established plans and channels that build upon
past activities. Expanding search-and-rescue exercises and allowing more than one annual U.S. Navy
ship visit are examples of building upon existing success.427 The recent establishment of a partnership with
the Oregon National Guard shows that Vietnam will
expand into new activities if treated as an equal partner. One scholar recommends that new ideas with the
Vietnamese are best broached through an exchange
of information and ideas leading to mutually desired
activities in areas such as humanitarian assistance,
peacekeeping operations, and disaster relief—and expanding to involve more active duty U.S. Army and
Marine forces.428 Experts from the Center for Strategic
and International Studies received reports from Vietnamese counterparts that Vietnam may also be interested in quietly training with U.S. Special Forces and
hosting a U.S. Navy research facility.429
Regional specialization of U.S. units and personnel is costly and comes at the expense of some combat
readiness, since engagement and combat training have
limited overlap. The investment in trained personnel
and established relationships would also have to be
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protected, requiring changes in the Army personnel
system to retain experienced military members and
minimize out-of-unit assignments—in essence creating a regimental system in the regionally aligned active forces.430 Task, equipment, and personnel specialization come with a price to large unit combat skills,
flexibility, and traditional force structure.431 In a major
operation elsewhere that requires the use of PACOMaligned units, all of this specialization may be for
naught, making necessary maneuver, fire, and effects
skills not as strong as their more often used engagement skills.432 In austere fiscal times, however, some
risk must be assumed in strategy and force structure
decisions, and U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno has made it clear: “We always have to
be prepared to fight our nation’s wars if necessary, but
in my mind, it’s becoming more and more important
that we utilize the Army to be effective in Phase 0, 1
and 2. . . .”433 To mitigate these risks, the DoD planning
considerations of flexibility and reversibility must be
inherent qualities in the formation of any regionally
aligned specialized units.434 Some military service control over its units might also be surrendered to allow
DoD to assign roles and regions to better coordinate
coverage and activities among all of the branches to
be more efficient and effective in their engagement.435
In these times, one potential advantage to regionally
aligned forces rotating into a region is that less infrastructure and cost is required in comparison to as
many units permanently stationed overseas.436 Ironic
and indirect as it seems, military-to-military engagement, especially using regionally aligned land forces,
may build the trust and influence necessary to ensure
that UNCLOS-compliant freedom of navigation is allowed by the coastal states of the South China Sea.
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Another very important step for the U.S. Government, to better ensure the freedom of navigation rights
it now exercises, is to formally ratify the UNCLOS
treaty. This step is not just to return to equal footing
with other members on moral, diplomatic, and legal
grounds in order to better support the rules-basedorder that the United States government espouses,
but also to be able to directly guide and protect U.S.
interests in international fora and on the seas.437 The
United States signed UNCLOS in 1994 after successfully negotiating an amendment to the document to
correct earlier concerns by the industrialized states,
but has not formally ratified it through the Senate.
The most important UNCLOS provisions, like maritime jurisdictions and right-of-passage, are in accord
with U.S. policy so that U.S. domestic law generally
adheres to UNCLOS statutes, as it also does with customary international law.438 The Department of State
and DoD both support ratification to give the United
States “greater credibility in invoking the convention’s rules and a greater ability to enforce them.”439
This treaty has come before the Senate several times,
as recently as 2012, only to be tabled despite bipartisan
support, mainly due to economic concerns with Part
XI stipulations that cover the deep seabed.440 A direct
American voice in the Law of the Sea Treaty debates
could advocate for freedom of navigation and other
U.S. interests as international law inevitably evolves,
in order to counter the historic trend to circumscribe
rights on the high seas by reducing its openness and
limiting areas of operations. Foreign military navigation rights through an EEZ are a prime example of
such restrictions with 26 countries supporting China’s
and Vietnam’s restrictive positions, including major
maritime states like India and Brazil.441 The Senate
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needs to ratify this treaty to allow the United States
to defend actively its existing maritime legal interests
and rights.
Another way to support freedom of navigation
rights in the South China Sea is to have China and Vietnam clarify their historic claims. In the modern era of
statutory maritime law, sweeping historic claims seem
archaic, too incongruous to effectively adjudicate an
area as openly used as the South China Sea, and the
ensuing disputes unnecessarily hobble economic development and peace.442 The International Court of
Justice has conceded that customary law does not provide for a clear method of adjudicating historic claims,
so each case is settled differently based on its specific
merits.443 This gives both Vietnam and China some basis for their historic claims even while the 1951 International Law Commission criteria make these claims
appear weak.444 Nonetheless, their restrictive interpretations of transit rules in conjunction with expansive
Chinese and Vietnamese claims to historic waters, if
enforced, could selectively close the very busy South
China Sea to military and commercial traffic, which
is why the United States and other maritime powers
have worked to diminish the doctrine of historic waters and curtail its widespread application.445 This is in
part what Secretary Clinton meant in her earlier quote
that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the South
China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate
claims to land features.”446
To defuse this problem, China and Vietnam should
declare what their historic rights entail—for example:
waters, islands, rights to activities, or some combination—and where they are claimed, since neither
country has been explicit in what it wants.447 So far,
it has cost the historic claimants little to hold these
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bargaining positions with such sweeping ambiguous
claims, and it has become a convenient distraction and
delaying tactic to a solution. The United States, along
with the ASEAN parties and other maritime states,
should press China and Vietnam “to particularize or
justify its claim” to set the stage for serious negotiations and eventual compromise on specific historic issues.448 Dropping notorious historic rights claims altogether, in favor of current maritime statutory law,
would simplify the dispute to just occupation doctrine
and UNCLOS provisions, although this is an unlikely
course given the current situation in the South China
Sea. Either method could successfully remove the
dead weight of historic claims to allow much needed
economic development around the South China Sea,
while also reducing the specter of security threats that
could derail other initiatives and engulf the region
in violence.
Vietnam will find it difficult to best China’s historic case in a legal dispute, and it cannot militarily
match China’s ability to back its claim with might (as
proven by the physical loss of the Paracels to Chinese
occupation).449 Under the principle of uti possidettis,
China’s current occupation gives it control over the
islands unless it chooses to give some up to Vietnam.
On the other hand, Vietnam has a much stronger occupation presence in the disputed Spratly Islands,
which China also claims in their entirety, and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim in part. Vietnam
might be convinced to transform its undefined historic claims for the steadier position under occupation
and UNCLOS laws in the Spratlys, especially if given
strong international support for current Vietnamese
island sovereignty and coastal EEZ and continental
shelf claims that comply with UNCLOS. In return,
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Vietnam would concede that its historic sovereignty
in the Paracels is no better than the Chinese, its ability
to reverse China’s occupation of the Paracels is slight
(barring some unlikely catastrophic event in China),
and it would gain little in maritime jurisdiction even
if it did gain control over the Paracels.
Such a policy recognizing the actual situation in
the South China Sea and legitimizing those positions
should garner consistent U.S. support in accordance
with Secretary Clinton’s call for settling legitimate
territorial and maritime claims using UNCLOS and
accepted international customary law. Indeed, UNCLOS provisions for the EEZ and continental shelf
were meant in part to replace historic claims, and
Vietnam might be a good candidate to do this.450 To
improve the deal, the international community should
also support specific historic economic rights for
Vietnam for well-documented activities like fishing,
which would include assured access to the area but
not jurisdiction over it.451 In return for internationally
recognized claims and rights, Vietnam would agree
to fully abide by majority interpretations of UNCLOS
to include freedom of navigation in its EEZ, innocent
passage in its territorial seas, and to drop its claim
to historic waters or title in the South China Sea. Indeed, Vietnam’s “internationalizing” strategy in these
disputes, assembling support under recognized law
in favor of its positions at regional fora such as the
2010 ARF, is meant to counter Chinese claims with the
weight of international consensus.452 Although a practical, logical compromise to a complicated situation,
the emotional nationalist and economic aspects of this
problem will make replacing historic claims difficult
under any combination of incentives that try to make
more legally accepted procedures work.453
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Unfortunately, there may be less incentive for China to clarify any of its claims in the South China Sea.
There are legal and political advantages for China to
obscure its historic, other customary, and UNCLOSbased claims together by “rigidly refus[ing] to clarify
the basis for its claims,”454 which are challenged in the
international community.455 Its occupation claims in
the Spratlys are on literally and figuratively shifting
ground, and its occupation of the Paracels was finalized by military conquest. Therefore, an ambiguous
historic stance in the region allows China to shift its
claim-support as circumstances dictate and not be held
accountable in the context of modern international
law, “even as the growth of its military and maritime
assets gain physical leverage over its weaker neighbors.”456 China may use ambiguity as a way to deflect
U.S. and other outside maritime states’ involvement
by obscuring topics to negotiate, and thereby keeping
what it considers regional bilateral issues from being
internationalized.457 The lack of specificity may also
result from political divides on these issues within the
government of the PRC, which may make any change
in policy arduous.458 China may be playing a weak
historic-claims-hand by keeping it close to its chest.
However, there may be influential elements in the
Chinese government that see its international role
growing and that its current restrictive navigation
policy not only sets the PRC at odds with most other
states, but also with its own future needs as an emerging world power requiring access to littoral regions
around the world. Among its divergent agencies, the
argument might prevail that the PRC should rely on
its growing navy for defense of its home waters rather
than weaker legalistic methods which may later be
used against them, especially if mutually acceptable
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methods to open EEZs to navigation are made in arrangements similar to INCSEA. At least one commentator has noted that the PRC’s recent legislation and
policy statements seem to be part of a trend of historic
waters being “gradually turned into the EEZ and continental shelf of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos”
without actually foregoing its assertions for historic
rights.459 Most parties would not want the United
States to be directly involved in negotiating any such
schemes, but it could, nonetheless, support such solutions indirectly through its good offices, expertise,
and material support.
U.S. Economic Interests.
Open economic access to the South China Sea maritime commons is the second U.S. interest listed for
the region by Secretary Clinton.460 PACOM’s regional
strategy acknowledges the importance of open access to the shared commons in the Asia-Pacific region
adding “that continued economic prosperity is tied to
the peaceful rise of China as an economic and military power,”461 making this economic issue one also
linked to security. Within the bounds of UNCLOS,
economic access includes the universal rights for commercial shipping and to exploit the natural resources
of the high seas.462 Short of open conflict or blockade,
however, the only threat to commercial passage in the
South China Sea is its designation as historic waters,
which would subject passage to restrictions similar
to transiting internal waters, worse than what foreign military craft have faced in PRC and Vietnamese EEZs. To date this remains just a possibility since
neither China nor Vietnam try to regulate commercial
traffic through their claimed historic waters or mari-
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time jurisdictions.463 The issue of commercial passage
through the South China Sea is directly linked to the
determination of historic waters in the region, meaning the discussion previously presented to reduce the
effects of historic rights will apply, supporting U.S.
economic interests as well.
If commercial navigation is not currently a problem, commercial exploitation of South China Sea resources may be. According to the UNCLOS preamble,
the high seas are interpreted as:
the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as
well as its resources, [and] are the common heritage
of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind.464

Although UNCLOS does regulate fishing and mineral
extraction (the most common forms of economic use
in these deep sea areas),465 developed countries with
high-end technology, expertise, and capital have an
advantage in exploiting “the common heritage of mankind.” For this reason, UNCLOS includes a regime
through the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to
regulate the remote gathering of strategic metals from
the seabed floor, considered potentially the most lucrative activity of the high seas, and distribute part of the
gained profits to all nations.466 As a semi-enclosed sea,
however, Article 123 also gives the bordering states
rights and duties to manage, conserve, and exploit the
living resources of the sea and protect the marine environment,467 which raises questions about who will
manage which parts of these high seas. None of the
South China Sea parties, especially China, are likely
to accept opening their sea’s bounty to shared profits
under ISA rules.468 Each of the South China Sea states
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has demonstrated its desire to improve its claims and
maximize natural resource gains from the sea, which
this monograph has shown is a major factor in the
disputes and violence among them.469 U.S. interests in
the economic uses of the high seas would be governed
by UNCLOS if the United States joins, but potentially
also by the South China Sea neighbors based on their
maritime claims or cooperative administration as a
semi-enclosed sea.470
Disregarding the historic waters issue—which
would make exploitation of this sea by other states
moot—the tangled claims in the South China Sea
leave in doubt how much may be high sea and how
much are within national jurisdictions. If measured as
just EEZs from coastal baselines without any islands
generating more than territorial waters—which is the
position taken by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines—then high seas would be the elongated center
of the South China Sea from north of Macclesfield
Bank, down to and including the western Spratly Islands to southwest of Rifleman Bank.471 Should China
succeed in its claim for the Paracel Islands and prove
they are habitable, the islands’ position within continental EEZs mean they may generate a relatively modest zone consisting of a sector around Macclesfield
Bank, which would become Chinese EEZ and reduce
the size of the northern high seas area.472 Commercial
rights to sea life, mineral, and energy resources on the
high seas depend in part on how territorial claims and
maritime jurisdictions are delimited based on island
sovereignty, because the remainder becomes high seas
for any state’s access. Thus the principle of maintaining openness is important as a precedent to ensure access to the high seas here and elsewhere in the world,
and to maintain the peace.
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U.S. economic interests face two problems then in
the South China Sea: the UNCLOS rules concerning
exploitation of the high seas, and how much of the
high seas are available in the area. The United States
has not formally ratified UNCLOS for several reasons,
but objections to Part XI covering exploitation of the
deep seabed is a main one because its provisions are
considered statist and not free-market oriented, and
the ISA is expensive and inefficient.473 Opponents also
see little gain in the South China Sea for U.S. ratification since the overlapping disputes would not only
remain but have no compulsory settlement agreement, and maritime jurisdiction issues like freedom
of navigation are exempt from mandatory arbitration
mechanisms. Thus these political issues do not change
whether the United States is a member or not.474 The
irony of opposing U.S. entry to UNCLOS is that in
the nearly 30 years since it was written, no country
or corporation, including the United States, has been
successful in commercially mining for high seas mineral resources, but the United States, which has the
world’s largest aggregate EEZ, benefits from the economic and environmental protection of its littoral that
UNCLOS provides.475 By its present stance, the United
States gains freedom from the ISA to potentially mine
seabed resources some day since it does not need to be
a member of UNCLOS to exploit international waters
under customary law, but it loses the advantages of
being inside the Law of the Sea Treaty system to guide
it and employ its provisions for future U.S. benefit.
Of greater importance for U.S. interests than the
laws covering the economic exploitation of the high
seas are the regimes that may govern these waters. In
addition to the different possibilities for maritime jurisdictions based on awarded sovereignty presented in
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this monograph, a governing regime relying on joint
development of the sovereign and/or international
zones of the South China Sea is possible. Although
the waters around the Paracel Islands will be divided
in one fashion or another between Vietnamese and
Chinese EEZs, the EEZ that a habitable Woody Island might generate to just beyond Macclesfield Bank
could be managed as a Joint Development Zone (JDZ)
to share resources, or a less robust Joint Management Zone (JMZ) to facilitate research and measures
to protect the environment and fishing stocks.476 In
these arrangements, jurisdiction claims are retained
by states in disputed areas, but each state has a part in
the exploration, development, or protection based on
a sharing agreement in ways that could also become
confidence-building measures.477 On a small scale, a
successful joint development area already operates
between Vietnam and Malaysia and could serve as a
model for Vietnam and China.478 This solution fulfills
Secretary Clinton’s goal of land and maritime claims
based on recognized international law in a collaborative diplomatic process.479 By sharing resources and
finally generating some of its economic potential, joint
management is a promising solution to develop the
region for both sides’ benefit.
The economic concern for the United States in these
schemes is whether such development in the high seas
is a venture under UNCLOS or customary law provisions that recognize all states’ rights, or whether the
high seas are to be controlled and administered by a
regional entity. If a jointly shared regional commons is
formed around the Paracels through combining coastal EEZs with the convenient interpretation that maritime jurisdictions are generated from the islands, the
resulting commons then pools the region’s resources
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for mutual benefit of the claimants. This type of approach is not explicitly sanctioned in UNCLOS, but has
international legal precedent in which Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were given “condominium”
ownership in the Gulf of Fonseca Case. A similar combination of national maritime jurisdictions and shared
claims through a condominium would eliminate the
international waters southeast of the Paracels, and a
much larger area if applied to the Spratly Islands.480
China has discussed such maritime joint use options
with Vietnam, but will not negotiate over the sovereignty of the Paracels.481 Although still hypothetical,
such a joint solution that liberally interprets international law to benefit regional states economically and
foster peace and security in the region at the expense
of the economic interests of outside parties poses a dilemma for the United States. A condominium solution
may impede the potential to exploit the high seas in
the region, or may introduce undetermined restrictions to navigation, both contrary to U.S. interests. On
the other hand, such a solution could promote peace
and stability among the states through diplomatic
processes and support economic development and expand energy availability in a region where it is sorely
needed. Although joint development may be China’s
best economic option in the South China Sea, its political and economic culture has made an equitable joint
management scheme difficult to implement.482
A joint development or management solution
would follow PRC communist party leader Deng
Xiaoping’s proclamation in the early-1990s that in the
South China Sea “sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint development,” a policy which subsequent Chinese leaders have embraced (during the
Indonesian Track II talks, for example), but of which
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other leaders are wary.483 Any joint development or
governing deal in the South China Sea is burdened by
the paucity of compromise and trust among the rim
states as discussed in this monograph.484 An analysis
of the South China Sea situation by the respected International Crisis Group warns that:
Joint development, while an opportunity for claimants
to cooperate and thereby reduce tensions, has stalled
as claimants resist China’s demands that they first accept its sovereignty over disputed areas. The failure
to reduce the risks of conflict, combined with the internal economic and political factors that are pushing claimants toward more assertive behavior, shows
that trends in the South China Sea are moving in the
wrong direction. . . . Claimants would benefit from
taking concrete steps toward the joint management of
hydrocarbon and fishing resources, as well as toward
reaching a common ground on the development of a
mechanism to mitigate or de-escalate incidents, even
if they cannot agree on an overall approach to dispute
resolution.485

As the sole occupier of the Paracels, China holds
a strong position and is likely to expect attractive advantages in a joint scheme, and would only join a joint
organization that is looser than the condominium solution described previously.486 Vietnamese diplomats
have had more success than others in negotiating
with China on joint issues like the maritime delimitation and fishing agreements in the Gulf of Tonkin,
which entered into force in 2004.487 The two states subsequently agreed in 2006 to explore bilaterally for oil
in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in 2013 expanded the exploration area and length of the agreement to 2016.488
Since 2005, their navies have conducted a dozen joint
enforcement patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin;489 and since
2010, they have held periodic defense-security strate99

gic dialogues to ensure peace and stability between
them.490 Timo Kivimaki suggests a transnational SinoVietnamese tourism project as a starting point,491 perhaps most equitably done on the Crescent Group using
Prattle, Money, or the Triton Islands, which are held
by China but in or near the Vietnamese EEZ. Hasjim
Djalal has observed that in the South China Sea, bilateral development agreements such as these are easier
to reach than multilateral agreements.492 These are
significant efforts at joint cooperation and development in the shared Gulf of Tonkin upon which similar
efforts around the Paracels, 300-nm to the southeast,
could be modeled.
Although such actions benefit both countries
through joint cooperation, as championed by Chairman Deng, relations between them remain complicated and difficult. Friction over development continues
as already shown in the failure of the JMSU among
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, which expired in
2008 because the smaller states believed the PRC only
wished to explore in disputed areas near their shores,
but not in contested areas which China was unilaterally exploiting.493 In 2013, Vietnam rejected a Chinese
maritime claim south of the Gulf of Tonkin and west of
the Paracels as the basis for joint energy development
because it was considered solely Vietnamese. Violent
incidents also routinely continue at sea between their
vessels.494 Some analysts believe that more certain and
rapid financial returns will motivate companies like
CNOOC to support joint development, yet its deployment of China’s first deep-water drilling rig to the
Paracels in 2012 and clashes near Triton Island over
Haiyang Shiyou 981 in 2014 show that CNOOC, too,
is willing to operate inside the dispute to support its
interests.495 Experts argue that joint partnerships lack-
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ing strong political will may be difficult while rivalry
persists; as Djalal instructed, “Development efforts
needed peace, stability and cooperation.”496 Because
of problems so far, South China Sea scholar Stein Tonnesson recommends postponing development until
after jurisdictions are delimited and shelving sovereignty issues altogether.497 U.S. policy, however, still
supports joint development, even in disputed areas,
by supporting diplomatic efforts such as the start of
drafting a code of conduct to the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2011 in
order to continue a diplomatic process.498
United States: Honest Broker or Balancer?
Based on U.S. interests and policy presented so
far, how should the United States engage in the South
China Sea disputes? It can play one of two roles, and
over time will probably engage in both as it pursues
its interests in regional stability and prosperity, navigation, and economic development, and as changing
circumstances dictate.499 The first role is that of honest
broker among the disputants helping, along with other
states, to resolve these thorny issues through “respect
for international law . . . collaborative diplomatic process . . . without coercion . . . [and] not take sides .
. .” as proposed by Secretary Clinton.500 Secretary of
Defense, Chuck Hagel, has also stressed addressing
threats through such engagement.501 The other role is
that of balancer recognizing that the sovereign states
in the region do not meet on a level playing field, and
that U.S. commitments and national interests obligate
the United States to take some parochial positions for
its own benefit or to support an enduring overall solution on behalf of a regional partner.502 These U.S. ap-
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proaches compensate for the PRC strategy in which
claims for land sovereignty and maritime delimitation are conducted bilaterally to gain advantage over
weaker claimants, while lesser and more encompassing issues like safety, anti-crime, and environmental protection may follow a multilateral approach.503
Brzezinski recently summed up this dual U.S. role as
the “balancer and conciliator between the major powers in the East.”504 One analyst calls this balance “defensive realist logic—increasing the security of allies
without threatening China directly,” or “containmentlite,” which supports and restrains a partner like Vietnam while also constructively engaging or deterring
a sometime competitor and collaborator like China.505
For these reasons, harmonizing these two roles is
crucial to American, Vietnamese (and other ASEAN
states), and Chinese long-term interests in regional
peace, cooperation, and prosperity.
When it serves to advance solutions in the South
China Sea, the United States should play the role of
honest broker because it shares common goals and
interests for peace and stability with China and the
ASEAN states.506 Since its recent rise to regional power, China and the United States keep returning to a
“constructive strategic partnership,” despite intermittent intervening crises, because their long-term interests ultimately overlap, and the need to manage them
together continues.507 When China joined the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003,
it signaled its intent toward equality and cooperation
with the members of ASEAN as part of China’s coexistence approach, which has had some success in
resolving land disputes elsewhere on its borders.508
Despite its past conflicts and current disputes with
China, Vietnam also relies on diplomatic negotiations,
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its hedging strategy of cultivating military ties with
China, and its other interactions to defuse tensions
with China.509 Even with these ties, however, China
has refused discussions specifically about the Paracels,
although China will discuss the status of the Spratly
Islands with Vietnam.510
The U.S. role of honest broker in the South China
Sea will encourage this engagement as equals while
offering the additional benefits of allowing the United
States to represent general international interests in
the region and provide sought-after defense cooperation to the ASEAN states to bolster their capabilities.511
As an honest broker, U.S. policy in National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41 seeks to “enhanc[e]
international relationships and promot[e] the integration of U.S. allies and international and private sector
partners into an improved global maritime security
framework to advance common security interests in
the Maritime Domain.”512 Following this line, PACOM’s 2013 strategy supports multilateral approaches with regional groups like ASEAN to develop relationships that build trust and reinforce international
norms, and it also engages with China to achieve a
variety of common bilateral and multilateral goals.513
Secretary Clinton especially singled out the longawaited full code of conduct negotiations that will
supplement the 2002 DOC, in which the United States
as a conciliator is “prepared to facilitate initiatives and
confidence building measures” among the parties.514
Such measures build the necessary trust in the United
States to help respond to crises or when support is
needed, and is simply good diplomatic practice in a
tense region with important U.S. interests.515
U.S. and regional state interests are best served with
an involved United States that can play the concilia-
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tor role when needed. This monograph has outlined
why U.S. interests are served this way, but so too are
the interests of the regional states. Without American
involvement, stronger states may assert themselves in
the disputes more, while, through miscalculation or
domestic pressure, weaker states may start incidents
they may not be able to contain.516 Among the regional
powers, neither China nor ASEAN, with substantial
direct interests in the dispute, nor Japan, with indirect
interests similar to the United States but with a negative legacy that makes it distrusted in the region, can
substitute in this role.517 Indonesia, through the Track
II talks it has hosted since 1990, has ably played the
role of diplomatic conciliator in the South China Sea
disputes, but Indonesia, too, may have maritime conflicts with China’s historic claims and lacks the substantial resources that the United States can bring to
influencing solutions.518 The United States may be a
good mediator because it has enough interests in the
disputes to remain engaged, diplomatic power to help
maintain the rule of law, important overlapping interests with each party (especially China) to be cautious
and balanced, sufficient distance from the region to
have no sovereignty claims and prefer local initiatives
and solutions, and is willing to include all affected
states in the process through programs like its Global
Maritime Partnership.519
This U.S. stance has been called “active neutrality,”
although, when necessary, that includes direct actions
like confronting the PRC when U.S. navigation interests are threatened, while also restraining a partner
perhaps when domestic nationalist sentiment spurs a
government to be too aggressive, as almost happened
in 2011 and 2014 when huge demonstrations in Vietnam and prominent citizens chastised their govern-

104

ment for being “too timid” in its responses to incidents
with China.520 The United States is thus an important
factor in promoting the peaceful and prosperous environment to which China and the other Asian states
have contributed and mutually benefited from, but
the United States has done so by allowing the states
involved to take the initiative for mediation.521
As shown, however, the U.S. position has not been
strictly neutral, and the United States has become involved in the dispute when deemed necessary. Until
the 1995 Mischief Reef incident in the Spratly Islands,
the United States did not intervene in the South China
Sea because the disputes did not affect global stability
or major U.S. interests. Since the end of the Cold War,
as the United States has perceived increasing threats
to the sea lanes and potential for military conflict in
the South China Sea, Chinese observers believe that
U.S. policy has evolved from active neutrality to “active concern,” and as a result the United States has
become more willing to intervene.522 PRC officials see
a less impartial United States siding with the Southeast Asian states at its expense, at least indirectly if
not in public, and that the United States may be slowly
abandoning neutrality.523 The strategic shift of focus
to the Pacific Rim and East Asia is a major example
of a more active and potentially parochial role for the
United States.
Some ASEAN states are anxious about the uncertainty around China’s growing power and possible
dominance of the region.524 Others, like Vietnam, have
already found China’s claims and behavior in the region to be overbearing and threatening, and quietly
welcome the U.S. commitment to deter potential aggression from the PRC to ensure security and allow
negotiations toward a settlement.525 In support, South
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China Sea powers have offered the United States access or basing rights, including Vietnam, allowing
use of the old U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay for
noncombat naval ship maintenance and visits of combat ships at other ports, while regional allies have
welcomed the U.S. renewed emphasis on the AsiaPacific region.526 Their fear is that when vital Chinese
interests have been threatened, the PRC has resorted
to conflict to protect them,527 and there is a possibility that the South China Sea may prove to be one of
those core Chinese interests.528 Through its military,
economic, and political power; cultivated ties with the
disputants; and its own national interests, the United
States alone may be the “external balancer providing
security guarantees to whatever state may be attacked
by another, and thereby making regional balances-ofpower much less significant.”529 However, the United
States must remain committed to involvement in the
region and can ill afford to be inconsistent by cancelling important engagement opportunities, like three
planned presidential visits since 2010 that were abandoned due to domestic U.S. incidents, which undercut the regional states’ perception of the United States
as a steadfast partner,530 or President Obama’s 2014
guarded foreign policy speech at West Point that left
South China Sea states questioning a strong American
commitment to their region.
Partiality in the disputes is due in part because
the Southeast Asian states seek a counterbalance to
nearby China, and the United States best serves in
that role today. For example, after its reunification
in 1975, Vietnam relied on the Soviet Union (until its
dissolution in 1991) as an ally to counter China.531 By
1992, ASEAN supported a U.S. military presence in
the region to balance Chinese growth, and Vietnam
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and the other states have since improved military cooperation with the United States to reinforce that commitment.532 To preserve its own interests and maintain
the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, the
United States needs to remain involved to protect the
maritime commons of East Asia and its partners from
intimidation.533 Doing so has its challenges, however,
since countering small incremental actions like an unauthorized Chinese oil rig in the Vietnamese EEZ or
a bout of Chinese ‘reactive assertiveness’ patrolling
more aggressively for fishing violations in its own
claimed areas may not be a causus belli for the United
States, but such actions accumulate to change the status quo in the South China Sea in China’s favor.534 The
Obama administration has worked to promote more
unity within ASEAN, which has no real defense arrangement, to better withstand Chinese pressure.535 To
this end, PACOM’s strategy seeks to strengthen relationships with ASEAN and its states, and specifically
“enhance our partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Vietnam, and others to advance common
interests and address shared threats,”536 while Vietnam and the Philippines have both sought stronger
backing from the United States and ASEAN in their island disputes with China.537 Brzezinski concludes that
in Asia the United States should play the dual role of
conciliator and regional balancer, as the United Kingdom did in nineteenth century European politics, by
“mediating conflicts and offsetting power imbalances
among potential rivals.”538
American balancing actions have weighed against
China when needed but usually in a way to not endanger its role as conciliator, since doing both are not
mutually exclusive activities and are part of a normal process of great power cooperation and compe-
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tition.539 In 2010, the United States maneuvered the
ARF agenda to make the South China Sea disputes a
primary topic for multilateral, not bilateral, discussions; and at the subsequent ARF meeting in Hanoi,
Secretary Clinton denounced unilateral actions in
the South China Sea and supported the need for all
parties to negotiate a code of conduct. This indirectly
condemned China for both its aggressive actions and
its recalcitrance to an already agreed-upon procedure,
while offering the branch of conciliation at the same
time to rectify the situation.540 Balancing also means
strengthening ASEAN military capabilities through
establishing or strengthening military cooperation
agreements, and forward deploying U.S. forces into
East Asia with Vietnamese engagement—perhaps the
fastest developing relationship in the region.541
The United States should continue its strategy of
robust deployments of naval, air, and ground forces, and alliances and cooperation with like-minded
states.542 These moves support U.S. interests in the
South China Sea as declared by Secretary Clinton,
thereby “internationalizing” the disputes to the consternation of the PRC, which loses diplomatic and
military advantage.543 U.S. intervention has been overt
as well, for instance, by loudly condemning Chinese
actions to establish the Sansha municipality over the
South China Sea islands, while not criticizing similar
earlier actions by Vietnam and the Philippines.544 In
addition, the U.S. Senate in 2011 unanimously approved a nonbinding resolution voicing “grave concern” over aggressive Chinese actions.545 U.S. officials
have also described Chinese jurisdiction claims within
the U-shaped line as excessive, and thereby some analysts believe “the United States is now a disputant in
the South China Sea disputes.”546 However, for the

108

United States, such measures provide the region the
military security needed for diplomacy to operate on a
relatively level field, or as a past Vietnamese ambassador bluntly stated, “If the United States does not show
some signs of support for the smaller countries on this
issue, Vietnam will have no choice but to accommodate China. . . .”547
The United States must manage adroitly its dual
roles. Because of its own interests and obligations, the
United States should continue to play the balancer
role, but needs to account for the significant benefits
and risks to the region in terms of peace and stability.548
U.S. involvement acts to deter the use of force, balancing weaker regional states’ power with that of the PRC,
and thereby constraining the parties to work within a
diplomatic and legal framework (while also drawing
the smaller states closer to the United States).549 For instance, after Secretary Clinton’s greater interest in the
South China Sea at the 2010 ARF, a Vietnamese diplomat exclaimed that China did not take Vietnam seriously before, but “they talk to us now.”550 The United
States must be alert, however, to not let such support
embolden some states and increase regional instability.551 U.S. support to a common ASEAN position in
the South China Sea, a position pushed by Vietnam
to link its Paracel Islands with the broader Spratly
Islands dispute that also involves the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei, could be seen as hostile by the
Chinese and make the region more violent.552 U.S.
support to the members of ASEAN balances China’s
power and allows ASEAN to rise as a regional power
on its own.553 Chinese observers believe that its bilateral engagements with the other states were beneficial
to the region until U.S. provocations internationalized
the disputes through “gunboat” policy.554 Too much
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or misapplied U.S. support in the region will not only
alienate China, but could also sow discord among the
ASEAN states, which runs counter to American intentions for ASEAN unity to balance Chinese power.555
Because of many mutual interests and a strong
economic embrace, the United States must remain
delicate and agile in its involvement in the region, but
it must also remain involved because there is no viable
alternative state for the roles it plays. As an honest
broker to the region, it offers resources and a proclivity for mediation that, in the long run, will result in solutions yielding a more stable, prosperous, and peaceful region based on the disputants’ participation. As a
balancer, the United States sets the conditions needed
for Vietnam to engage as a bilateral equal in the spirit
of international law. Because the United States does
this to further its own interests in conjunction with
those of China and the ASEAN states, its commitment
to these goals should be significant and enduring
through building trust and reinforcing international
norms. The United States alone can deter aggression
by any state.556 China and the ASEAN states should
accept the United States as an honest broker to keep
America’s role relatively neutral, and also allow it to
balance to ensure better solutions are determined in
equal negotiations or under international law. At the
same time, the United States should recognize that
the ASEAN states, including Vietnam, are also hedging their bets with military ties to the PRC.557 Should
the United States play its dual roles correctly, it can
be called upon to be both mediator and deterrent.558
Should the United States overemphasize either role, it
could embolden aggression by appearing too weak to
enforce stability, or too partisan to contribute to peace.
The United States and China must find a way to balance their respective “integration” and “coexistance”
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approaches to international affairs to maintain the
peace in Asia.559 Thus Brzezinski concludes, “If the
United States and China can accommodate each other
on a broad range of issues, the prospects for stability
in Asia will be greatly increased.”560
CONCLUSION
The region around the Paracel Islands and the
South China Sea is fraught with physical, economic,
political, and military hazards. This region is important to the economies of the surrounding states in
terms of the fish they eat and sell and the potential
for energy resources needed to fuel their growing
economies. This bonanza of riches spurs much of the
outsized claims in the region that result in diplomatic
and physical clashes. This is unfortunate because the
conditions these confrontations create reduce outside
investment in the region, squander resources through
their unregulated use, and hinder the states from cooperating for their mutual economic benefit. The high
flow of maritime commerce through the South China
Sea is also crucial to the economic well-being of this
region and the world. Although the waters around
the Paracel Islands are economically important, the
islands themselves are less so. China’s firm—if contested—occupation of the Paracels, however, gives it a
distinct advantage in the region for security purposes,
and because possession of the islands may allow control over more of the surrounding waters.
Although direct military confrontations have diminished since the 1990s, civilian enforcement agencies have been active in protecting claimed spaces,
sometimes employing violence resulting in deaths.
Because partner countries rely on the United States to
ensure stability in the South China Sea, and to address
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its own interests in maintaining freedom of navigation
rights and economic development of the international seabed, the United States should remain engaged
with the South China Sea states on issues of mutual
concern. The United States has also been embroiled in
the circumstances in support of partners like Vietnam
through confrontation with the PRC over rights of
navigation through claimed waters. The United States
must be wary of both overplaying its position or having a partner do so and alienating the PRC, or allowing the PRC to use the South China Sea as a crucible in
which to test American resolve or bait a trap as part of
a confrontational military rise. To better address these
concerns, policymakers need to understand the underlying problems and conflicting claims that threaten
security and prosperity in this region.
The use of customary and UNCLOS law in establishing claims to the Paracels and surrounding waters
helps explain both the perspectives of the disputants
and how they have, in part, interacted with each other and the United States on the issues of rights and
claims. Their legal positions are especially important
for American policymakers as they inform possible
solutions and suggest how to contribute to peace and
prosperity in the region. Three key legal questions
must be answered to help sort the disputes: sovereignty over the islets, the nature of a claimed land
feature, and the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction.
Sovereignty is claimed through customary law, with
China and Vietnam both using historic doctrine to
claim the entire South China Sea, while both have also
used the doctrine of occupation to claim the Paracels.
Both states support their claims with efforts at effective administration through establishing laws governing their possessions under municipal governments,
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economic activities, or, in the case of China, inhabiting
them. The establishment of UNCLOS precepts made
otherwise unproductive land features valuable. Establishing control over them using customary law has
sometimes spurred clashes.
Developed to reflect modern interpretations of international law, UNCLOS offers guidance to maritime
disputes in the South China Sea but is not a comprehensive solution. Once sovereignty of a land feature is
determined, UNCLOS stipulates its jurisdiction over
surrounding waters based on its human characteristics. This process is meant to maintain tranquility
in the ocean commons through establishing various
maritime zones with graduated degrees of sovereign
rights for the state. Islands designated as inhabitable
or economically viable accrue more consideration
than uninhabitable rocks and other features making
habitability of the larger Paracel Islands an important
question to be resolved, whether or not the claiming
states cooperate to establish a joint maritime zone.
Once sovereignty and feature type are determined, zones of authority may be established by the
occupying state depending on the distance from its
established shore baseline. Internal, archipelagic, and
historic waters are maritime variations of near-full
sovereign control, which could be disruptive to economic and navigation activities. Vietnam or China, for
instance, could control most of the South China Sea if
either historic claim was affirmed. Islands above the
high tide mark establish territorial waters and a contiguous zone, which would carve 24-nm zones around
the Paracels, but should allow innocent passage even
if restricting most other maritime activities. However,
Vietnam and China do not recognize innocent passage
for naval ships, which makes such zones a major concern for the United States government.
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Since the length of the 200-nm EEZ allows much
potential overlap among land masses and islands in
the semi-enclosed South China Sea, their delimitation through equidistant or equitable principles affects jurisdiction, and, like territorial waters, Vietnam
and China restrict military activities within the EEZ
beyond the economic regulation normally allowed.
Habitability of an island is a significant issue for EEZ
delimitation since only populated or economically viable islands may claim an EEZ. The awarding of an
EEZ affects freedom of navigation and the potential
for U.S. economic development in otherwise international waters. Although such arguments by claimants
for more restrictions in these zones are tenuous, they
could be useful justification to cover military actions
by states such as China, which is the most active internationally in enforcing a restrictive EEZ.
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is
the most immediate concern for the United States
in order to ensure naval vessels retain all the rights
of access allowed in the region under international
maritime law. Current policy in China and Vietnam
restricts foreign naval activities in their zones beyond
that normally attributed to UNCLOS. This is a bad
precedent for U.S. maritime access around the world,
but the United States has options to improve the
situation in the South China Sea. First, it has already
signed the MMCA with the PRC and the CUES with
19 additional states to reduce the number of maritime
incidents between the two countries. Concluding an
INCSEA with the PRC would clarify further the rights
and responsibilities between the two, especially when
operating within each other’s maritime jurisdictions,
while also remaining fully compliant with international law and significantly reducing the potential for
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future clashes. Other forms of government-to-government interaction would build confidence in present
and future agreements, leverage common interests—
as the USCG has done so well with its PRC counterparts—and would also reduce tensions in the region
to enhance freedom of navigation. Through engagement activities of regionally aligned forces, the U.S.
Army could become a significant influence in making
the United States both a conciliator and balancer in the
region.
U.S. ratification of UNCLOS is another important
step to influence the evolution of future interpretations
of freedom of navigation toward more open stipulations than some of the states around the South China
Sea now espouse. Although a more difficult proposition, the United States should demand the clarification
of the historic claims made in the South China Sea, in
order to facilitate negotiating a settlement, accelerate
economic development, and remove the potential of
shutting down all foreign navigation through the region. Support to Vietnam’s current islet occupations in
the Spratlys, its claims to coastal EEZ and continental
shelf areas in compliance with UNCLOS, and specific
historic economic rights could wean Vietnam from its
otherwise weak historic claims, and start sincere bargaining by linking the Paracel and Spratly disputes
in a comprehensive agreement. The United States
has less influence to change China’s position on historic rights because the ambiguity of its positions has
served China well. Here, appealing to China’s future
role in world politics may help to change its parochial
freedom of navigation perspective into a more global
one like the United States holds.
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Open economic access to the South China Sea
maritime commons is a second U.S. interest, but one
for which the solution may diverge from freedom of
navigation considerations. Access to the resources of
the high seas is an important enough U.S. interest to
stall the ratification of UNCLOS for nearly 20 years
in order to avoid the restrictions imposed on seabed
mining, although this activity has yet to become commercially viable. While the United States remains outside the treaty, however, it holds less influence over
how maritime law is interpreted and evolves, and
thus is at a disadvantage to shape events like whether
the South China Sea becomes a wholly divided and
claimed sea. Such arrangements as a joint development zone or a joint management zone could stabilize
the area to provide peace and the dividends of economic development for its participants. This could
detract from potential U.S. economic development
activities, depending on the arrangements, but supports U.S. security and economic prosperity goals for
the region as well as attains a diplomatic settlement
through recognized international law.
To contribute to overall stability and prosperity in
the region—and its own freedom of navigation and
economic interests—the United States must delicately
play the roles of conciliator and balancer as circumstances require. The United States is an honest broker
through “active neutrality” because it shares goals
in common with the states around the South China
Sea, in accord with existing U.S. policy. Although
the United States may not be truly neutral, it has less
direct demands in the disputes, garnered more trust
than most other states, and possesses resources to bear
on these problems making it a useful interlocutor in
resolving problems.
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In other circumstances, the United States has intervened in problems in the South China Sea in more
parochial ways to balance the diplomatic field in aid
of allies and defense partners, and to directly protect
its freedom of navigation interests in a policy some
have dubbed “active concern.” Just as the U.S. honest broker role limited the demands that its partners
might make in the disputes, the balancer role should
deter aggressive stances by any party lest the United
States throw its weight to the other side. The balancer
role is also dictated because ASEAN lacks a defense
arrangement by which to counter the influence of a
much stronger PRC. As a balancer, the United States
has improved its military relationship with Vietnam
in a remarkably short time, and challenged Chinese
actions which Chinese officials have complained “internationalizes” the issues. The balancing role should
be minimal so as to not overshadow the conciliator
role, since both are necessary roles that only the United States can play well in order to achieve the peaceful
settlements toward security and economic interests
that all the states ultimately want. In short, all parties
should welcome a nuanced U.S. role as both conciliator—to keep the United States relatively neutral in the
disputes—and balancer—to deter aggressive actions
and thus support diplomatic solutions.
This monograph presented the most important
economic, security, and diplomatic interests that
the United States has in the region. Its involvement
as described must be nuanced to balance conflicting requirements to ensure its freedom of navigation
through these waters, which also reinforces similar
rights around the world, and economic development
interests. The balancer role ensures that the disputants
may represent themselves as full sovereign states in
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negotiations with each other, while the United States
simultaneously maintains good economic and diplomatic relations with each of the claimant states as a
conciliator. For these reasons, the United States has
again made the Asia-Pacific region a major focus of its
stated global interests, and converging national interests between the United States and China may indicate that some progress on the issues outlined here are
possible. In the end, the conflicts in the Paracel Islands
and South China Sea are not for the United States to
solve, but its ability to contribute, facilitate, balance,
or support is necessary toward a solution from which
all may benefit.
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